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i
Abstract
The essays in this collection concern two subjects, each of which falls within the purview
of the philosophy of mathematics. The rst three essays concern the philosophical status
of category theory. The last essay concerns the possibility of a social constructivism
regarding mathematicalia.
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Introduction
There are four essays in this collection. All four fall under the broad umbrella of phi-
losophy of mathematics. Three of the essays concern philosophical aspects of category
theory. The fourth demonstrates the unacceptability of social constructivism as an ac-
count of the ontology of mathematics. In this introduction I will summarize each of the
papers and draw what connections there are to be drawn among them.
Chapter 1
The rst paper in the collection, Category Theory is a Contentful Theory, examines
complaints that were made in [1] about the contentfulness of category theory. The
claim made in that paper was that, unlike set theory, category theory suered from a
lack of content. By this the authors meant roughly that one cannot, from the axioms of
a theory like that presented in [2] alone, determine what type of thing a category might
be.
In this chapter, I refute the claim that category theory suers from a lack of content
by demonstrating that categories can be perfectly well understood as \ways of combining
two things to make a third". This is then extended to include the second component of
CCAF, namely, functors. Functors can be understood simply as \ways of associating
one thing to another". CCAF, then, is to be understood as having two sorts of content:
some of what it describes is to be understood as ways of combining two things to make
a third, some of it as ways of associating one thing to another.
1
2Chapter 2
The second paper in the collection, Categories for the Neologicist, produces a neologicist
theory of categories. Neologicism, which is a contemporary re-imagining of the project
begun by Frege in his Grundgesetze (see [3]), has seen a recent spike in interest. A
major reason for this is the philosophical insights provided by the apparently purely
mathematical results it encourages one to explore. It is worth saying a few words about
this.
The general \game" of neologicism involves nding sentences in second- and higher-
order logical languages that have as their consequences theories that are bi-interpretable
(in a strict sense) with theories that describe various families of important mathematical
objects. The paradigm example of this is Hume's Principle, HP: the second order
sentence that (intuitively) says two concepts have the same number just if there is a
bijection from the objects falling under one to the objects falling under the other.
If we let THP be the second order theory generated by HP and PA
2 be the second-
order theory generated by the second-order Peano axioms for arithmetic, then there are
translations between THP and PA
2 that preserve theoremhood and commute in such
a way that one can see THP proves exactly what PA
2 \says it should" and vice versa
(these technical details are explained more carefully below). The upshot is this: in terms
of just HP, one can prove (an analogue of) every theorem of arithmetic one might want,
and can prove nothing more than this. So the single sentence HP somehow \contains"
the entirety of arithmetic. One has reason to expect, then, that HP in some sense gives
the \essential features" of the objects of arithmetic { that is, of numbers. The fact that
HP can intuitively be read as saying that numbers correspond to bijection-classes of
concepts is an added bonus, since one intuitively expects that number ought to have
this feature.
Given the success of HP in providing philosophical insight into numbers, then, one
avenue of contemporary work in neologicism involves proving similar results for other
mathematical theories. In my second chapter, I do this for categories { I produce an
abstraction principle that gives us objects corresponding in an intuitive way to cate-
gories. The fact that the natural way to do this involves the arrows-only denition
of a category (the denition of category underwriting the presentation of categories as
3\ways of combining two things to make a third") suggests that the arrows-only deni-
tion of categories { which might initially strike one as ad hoc or stilted in some way {
is something like \the right" way to think of categories.
Chapter 3
The third paper in the collection is by far the most technical. It can be seen, to some
extent, as the completion of the project begun in Chapter 2. Rather than producing
an abstraction principle aimed at providing a theory of categories alone, Chapter 3
aims to produce an abstraction principle that provides us with a theory of categories of
categories. The philosophical insights in this case are far more rewarding.
The inspiration for this project (to which the project in Chapter 2 was a warm-up)
came from an examination of Lawvere's dissertation, reprinted in [4]. In the course of
laying out the axioms for his category of categories, Lawvere very early on points out
the importance of the fact that 2 is a generator for the category of categories.
In categorial terms, this means that functors can be distinguished by examining
the collection of functors that result from precomposing them with a functor from the
category that looks like this:
 // 
If functors A and B are distinct but have the same domain, there will be a functor F
from a category with this shape to the common domain of A and B so that when F is
composed with A the result is dierent from when F is composed with B.
In his dissertation, Lawvere provides a formal language in which this result corre-
sponds to the following sentence:
8A8B8f8g[A f //B ^ A g //B ^ 8u(2 u //A ) fu = gu)) f = g]
The syntactic form of this sentence was sucient similar to that of an abstraction prin-
ciple that I immediately suspected one could build an abstractionist theory of categories
of categories directly from an abstraction principle of essentially the same form. Chap-
ter three is the (extended, technical) demonstration that this basic insight is correct.
In terms of the results provided in Chapters 1 and 2, it lends support to a very simple
4description of categories of categories: a category of categories is a way of combining
two things to make a third in which one of the objects is \2-ish" and acts as a generator.
It is, to me, entirely surprising that \2 is a generator" is to categories of categories
as \numbers correspond to bijection-classes" is to arithmetic.
Chapter 4
In Chapter 4 I turn my attention to matters ontological. In [5], [6], and [7], there is a
conversation about the possibility of seeing mathematicalia as social constructs. Very
roughly, the dialogue is as follows:
 In [5], Julian Cole proposes a carefully crafted theory of mathematicalia as social
constructs.
 In [6], Jill Dieterle points out and carefully argues the relevance of a temporal ob-
jection to social constructivism about mathematicalia. Specically, Dieterle points
out that mathematicalia are paradigm examples of atemporal objects, which seems
to conict with their being social constructs.
 In [7], Julian Cole responds by taking his social constructivism further: not only
are mathematicalia socially constructed, so are their \temporal proles". That is,
not only do we construct the objects, we also declare at what times the objects
are to have existed.
The problem with Cole's response is that it would seem that it is susceptible to a
\higher-order" version of Dieterle's complaint. That is, if temporal proles are also
social constructs, then they too must be objects that were constructed at some particular
time. This, in turn, forces us to confront temporal oddities of the following form: for
some objects x and times t1, t2 and t3, it will be the case that, at t1 the sentence \x
existed at t3," will be true but at t2 the sentence \x existed at t3" will be false. In
particular, since Cole produced his account of socially constructed temporal proles in
order to allow for atemporal mathematicalia, we must say that there are times t1 and
t2 such that at t1 the number seven existed atemporally, but at t2, the number seven
did not exist atemporally.
5In this chapter I provide a formal language and formal semantics with which we can
make sense of this type of multi-temporal claim. Unfortunately for Cole, the results
are not promising: neither the account he provides, nor any natural extension (and
even some unnatural extensions { I show in an appendix that the result extends even
to transnite multi-temporalities) of it will allow him to claim mathematicalia as social
constructs and avoid what amount to roughly the same problems as those Dieterle
pointed out.
Remarks on Some Common Themes
The papers found in this dissertation were not meant to form a coherent whole, so
I won't pretend they do. Nonetheless, they were all written by me and written in
a roughly fteen-month period, so it would be somewhat surprising if there were no
common threads whatsoever. Here I'll comment on a few of these threads. I group
my comments into two families: remarks on categories and remarks on mathematical
objects.
Remarks on Categories
There was an impressively long-lasting philosophical debate that took place around the
status of category theoretic foundations of mathematics. It began with [8], was most
recently summarized in [9], and in between was (directly) touched upon by [10], [11],
[12], [13], and [14] among others.
The conversation has made at least one thing clear: the appropriateness of cate-
gory theory as a setting for doing foundational work is, at best, suspect. What one
must not conclude from this is that categories { and categories of categories { are in
themselves somehow \defective". The rst of my papers examines one instance where
such a conclusion seems to have been drawn, and corrects the error. The second and
third papers demonstrate that both category theory and category-of-category theory
are perfectly acceptable parts of mathematics even from the exacting standards given
by the neologicists.1
1 Admitedely, one could adopt more exacting standards than the neologicists have, though they're
far from being the least exacting.
6All of that, however, is more of a metaphilosophical than a properly philosophical
point. The properly philosophical conclusions to draw from my examination of category
theory are (a) that categories without objects are, in some sense, the appropriate objects
of category theory, and that (b) the central status in category theory of the sentence \2
is a generator" deserves more philosophical attention.
Remarks on Mathematical Objects
Regardless of the status of categorial foundations, the constructions Lawvere gave in his
thesis shed a dierent light on many mathematical objects. A group, if we are speaking
set-theoretically, is a set together with a certain type of binary operation. A group, if
we are speaking categorially, is a one-object category all of whose arrows are invertible.
These are remarkably dierent ways of looking at \the same" mathematical object.
Now, let's suppose for a moment that we've settled on ZFC as the \one true foun-
dation" for mathematics. Let Denition 1 be \a group is a one-object category all of
whose arrows are invertible" and let Denition 2 be \a group is a set with an associa-
tive binary operation that admits an identity and inverses". Even having settled on
foundational matters, if we take the constructions implied by the Denitions 1 and 2
seriously { that is, if we build groups in the rst case by building categories, or in the
second place by equipping a set with a binary operation { the resulting objects will be,
in general, dierent. Thus there is a strong sense in which what given a mathematical
object is seems to vary with one's perspective.
One could be tempted to explain this phenomenon by saying that mathematical
objects are social constructs { after all, it seems that, given a singular term t occurring
in my group theoretic practice, the referent of t might be one thing if I'm working
category-theoretically and something entirely dierent if I'm working set-theoretically.
It appears to be a small step from here to social constructivism { if the referent of the
singular term t is determined not by t, nor by the language t gures in, but instead by
the theory we choose to work in, then it seems what t is varies with a characteristically
social choice.
It's important to get a handle on where this argument goes wrong. The position
I advocate is similar to the position Eli Hirsch has argued we should adopt regarding
quantier variance in a series of essays collected in [15]. It can be put quite simply: the
7sort of \semantic pluralism" just pointed out does seem to have as a consequence that
what a singular term refers to can vary, and that this variance is a function of social
actions. This does not, however, entitle us to conclude that the things a singular term
manages to refer to are themselves social constructs.
The point is subtle and requires being made delicately. Let t be a singular term
occurring somewhere in theory T . Suppose we have on hand a family of ways of doing
T -theory, and let the referent of the term t when doing T -theory in way i be si. If
it is a social action that determines whether one does T -theory in way i or in way j,
then it is a social action that determines whether t means si or sj . This is, I admit a
limited form of social construction { what particular object t picks out varies with social
action. But this is not a social constructivism worth writing home about { nobody ever
doubted that social actions determined the meanings of words, and that had we used
words dierently, or should we decide to do so tomorrow, words would mean dierent
things. This much is obvious.
A social constructivism that would be worth writing home about would be a demon-
stration that (at least some of) the si are themselves socially constructed. Nothing in
the realm of semantic pluralism warrants our making this further conclusion { it is one
thing for us to take a vote to decide whether, starting tomorrow, the word \glurb" ought
to refer to the number seven or the Supreme Court. It is another thing for us to take a
vote to decide what the number seven or the Supreme Court is. In the former case we
are constructing a new fragment of our language { we are deciding what, from among
a range of options, we are going to take the word \glurb" to mean. In the latter case
we are deciding what various objects actually are.
Returning to the case at hand: category theory and set theory provide dierent
settings in which one can do large amounts of mathematics. It is plausible that the
referents of many of our mathematical terms will vary with our choice of setting for
doing mathematics. We thus can { to an admitedly limited degree { choose what the
referents of our mathematical terms are. But this should not lead us to conclude the
referents of our mathematical terms are themselves the kind of thing that depend on
social action. Social constructivism about mathematicalia is a position that cannot be
sensibly maintained { this is the conclusion of the nal essay in this collection. The
8fact that we can choose to use \group" in either a \category-theoretic way" or a \set-
theoretic way" ought not lead us to conclude that groups are social constructs, but only
that the meaning of the term \group" is to some extent determined by social action.
Chapter 1
Category Theory is a Contentful
Theory
Introduction
In [1], some objections to category theory as an autonomous foundation are presented.
The authors of that paper do a commendable job making clear several distinct senses
of \autonomous" as it occurs in the phrase \autonomous foundation." Unfortunately,
the paper seems to treat the \categorist" perspective rather unfairly. Several infelicities
of this sort were addressed by [16]. I wish in this note to address yet another apparent
infelicity.
1.1 Categories as Autonomous
The subject of this chapter is the comments in [1] concerning the contentfulness of
William Lawvere's axiomatic system CCAF.1 For details of this system itself the
reader is encouraged to consult [2] or [4]. No technical details from these expositions
will be needed, however.
The authors of [1] are willing to admit \CCAF asserts the existence of certain
1 A side note: CCAF is often assumed to abbreviate either \category of categories and functors" or
\category of categories as foundation." In Lawvere's thesis, however, the system normally called CCAF
appears under the heading \category of categories and adjoint functors".
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categories and describes some of the functors between them." However, as they correctly
point out, this by itself is insucient for CCAF to serve as a foundation of mathematics.
As the authors point out, a necessary condition for CCAF to serve as a foundation
of mathematics is that be contentful, and, \if it is to make a contentful assertion, we
need to be able to identify its subject matter { namely, categories { independently of
the theory." The authors provide us an illustrative example of a non-contentful theory
to help make this objection more clear.
\[A lack of content] would be the problem, for instance, with the theory
that consists of the following sentence: `the mome raths outgrabe'. The
reason that this theory lacks content is that there is no way of identifying,
independently of the theory, what mome raths are, or what it is to outgrabe.
Without identifying the subject matter of the theory in such a way, the
statements of the theory do not make contentful assertions." [1, p. 231]
Presumably (and the authors are certainly correct here) a theory that runs afoul this
objection (which I will call the Contentful Theory Objection [CTO]) cannot serve as an
autonomous foundation for mathematics.
Of course, a proponent of CCAF can respond to CTO by simply providing a CCAF-
free identication of the subject matter of category theory. The problem, the authors
hold, is that this cannot be accomplished without running afoul what they call the Logi-
cal Dependence Objection [LDO]: if any theory T is to provide an alternative foundation
for mathematics to the foundation provided by set theory, it must not be the case that
T \depend[s] logically on a prior theory of classes and functions in order to ground [its]
existential assertions." That is, if one cannot identify what the content of T is without
appealing to classes and functions, then T does not qualify as an autonomous founda-
tion for mathematics. In the case of CCAF, Linnebo and Pettigrew seem to suggest
that any attempt to avoid CTO by providing a CCAF-free identication of the subject
matter of category theory will, in the process of describing this subject matter, make
appeal to a prior theory of classes and functions. That is, they claim any attempt to
avoid CTO is bound to run afoul LDO. In the remainder of this note I show this is
simply false.
First let's get clear on the content of LDO. As it applies to CCAF it's fairly clear:
if we claim the objects studied by CCAF are, e.g. \things like the category with groups
11
for objects and group homomorphisms as arrows" then the identication we've made is
logically dependent on a prior set theory since groups and group homomorphisms are
dened set-theoretically.
It's less clear what LDO has to say about set theory itself. Presumably set theory
is contentful, so there is some way of identifying its subject matter independent of set
theory itself. Also, since if anything is an independent foundation for mathematics, set
theory is, one would hope this identication would not also run afoul LDO.
So what, then, is the content of set theory? Georey Hellman has argued for a
particularly compelling and parsimonious answer in his [17]:
Set theory is about the operation of collecting. (1)
Thus if set theory manages to avoid CTO without running afoul LDO, it must be
the case that I have a set-theory-free way W of understanding what \collecting" is, and
W itself must not depend on prior understanding of some mathematical theory. Let's
examine how the set theory supporter might go about supplying such a W .
To begin, she could claim \collecting" simply is suciently denite to serve as the
content of set theory. This amounts to claiming that
(a) The notion of \collecting" needs no further explanation to be understood,2 and
(b) Using this notion we can identify, independently of set theory, the content of set
theory.
If we allow set theory this recourse, surely CCAF can help itself to a similar one; the
CCAF-theorist can then easily avoid CTO without running afoul LDO by claiming
Category theory is about the operation of combining two
things to make a third.
(2)
Actually, the phrase \ways of combining two things to make a third" only suces as a
partial specication of the subject matter of CCAF. More specically, CCAF is a rst
2 Note this claim seems extremely dubious in light of the antinomies of nave set theory { we will
not address this point in this paper.
12
order theory about those ways of combining two things to make a third that satisfy the
following two conditions:
(a) Whenever the combination of a with b (which we will write ab) and the combination
of b with c (which we will write b  c) are dened, then both a  (b  c) (that is, the
combination of a with b  c) and (a  b)  c (that is, the combination of a  b with
c) are dened and further these two combinations of things are actually the same
thing; and
(b) It must admit, for each \combinee," both a left combination-identity and a right
combination-identity.
Of course CCAF is supposed to be a rst order theory of a category of categories, so
to those unfamiliar with category theory it may not be obvious at rst that \ways of
combining two things to make a third" could be its subject matter. After all, \ways of
combining two things to make a third" makes mention of neither objects nor arrows.
One might thus wonder where its categorial content is supposed to come from.
These worries are easily laid to rest { it has been long known (actually since the
beginning of category theory in [18]) that objects are superuous to the denition of
a category; their role can be played by arrows. When characterizing categories in an
object-free way, the only axioms that matter are those specifying that the composition
of arrows be associative and that it admit, for each arrow, a left and a right identity
element. Categories viewed from this perspective are nothing more than a type of
algebra of arrows { that is, a way of combining two things (arrows) to make a third
(their composite). Since the object-free characterization of categories is in fact precisely
the characterization that underlies CCAF, it is especially appropriate to use here. I
turn now to examining a few objections to the idea that (2) is suciently denite to
serve as the subject matter of category theory.
1.2 Objection 1
One might see the word \things" in (2) and object that \ways of combining two things
to make a third" is not suciently denite to characterize anything until we've been
13
told what the membership-structure of the \thing-space" is. This seems to be what
Linnebo and Pettigrew address in one of their footnotes:
\the proponent of CCAF as a foundation may complain that a category need
not involve a set of objects and a set of arrows but rather a collection or
aggregate of objects and a collection or aggregate of arrows. But this will
not buy him much time, since our best theory of collections or aggregates
or pluralities of any sort is set theory."[1, p. 232, footnote 5]
But why must the CCAF-supporter specify at all what structure is formed by the
relation \x is an arrow of category y" just because the Set Theory-supporter is in the
habit of doing so? It seems perfectly coherent to study \ways of combining things"
without needing information about the structure formed by the membership pattern
that holds between the things being combined and their totality.
For example: one can easily imagine building physical instantiations of associative
ways of combining two things to make a third that admit left and right identities. These
would be machines that take in two things and output a third, and which behave as they
ought to in order to model this description. A trained mechanic could probably build
many such machines, repair such machines when they broke, identify when two such
machines were essentially the same, etc. All of this could be done without a moment's
thought being given to what structure was being instantiated by relation \x is a possible
input to machine y," or whether there is such a structure at all { the mechanic could
work perfectly well with the relation \x can combine with something to produce an
output" instead, for example.
Perhaps an alternative argument will make this clearer: if we take as primitive the
membership relation, then it can appear the CCAF-supporter has failed to specify the
membership-structure of her space of arrows.3 But by the same token, if we take
as primitive \ways of combining two things to make a third," then it can appear as if
the set-theorist has similarly failed to specify the combination-structure of her spaces
3 This may appear to be the case, but it is at least debatable whether it is the case. One can make
perfectly coherent the notion of a discrete category within CCAF; and can use this notion to dene
the words \set," \membership," and the like (again, the interested reader is urged to consult Lawvere's
work for the details). Nonetheless, arguing for the claim that CCAF admits a membership relation
that is as robust as the membership relation present in, say, ZFC is not relevant to the details of this
particular paper.
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of elements. So when one begins either from the assumption that \x is a member of y"
is primitive or that \combining x with y gives z" is primitive, those structures specied
only in terms of the other relation seem insuciently specied.
1.3 Objection 2
One could perhaps object that, even if \ways of combining two things to make a third"
is suciently denite to dene the content of some theory, nonetheless in order to single
out those ways that are associative and admit left and right identities (which we must
do to specify the content of CCAF in particular) one must have a prior understanding
of sets. Thus, even if we can understand \ways of combining two things to make a
third" without relying on a prior theory of collection and membership, we nonetheless
need such a theory to be able to state which particular ways we are interested in as
CCAF-theorists.
But we can state versions of the usual category-axioms specifying the associativ-
ity of composition and the existence of identity morphisms without quantifying over
collections at all as follows:
Let W be a way of combining two things to make a third. Let a W b stand
for the result of combining a and b (in this order) in wayW . Then we sayW
is an associative way of combining two things to make a third that admits
left and right identities if
 Whenever a W b and b W c are dened, so are a W (b W c) and
(a W b) W c and these two are equal.
 For every a there are things 1sa and 1ta so that
aW 1sa = a and for any b if either of bW 1sa or 1sa W b is dened
then it equals b; and
1ta W a = a and for any b if either of 1ta W b or bW 1ta is dened
then it equals b.4
4 It may appear that these two by themselves leave open the possibility that the identities are
not unique. However, if 1sa and 1
0
sa were two right identities for a, then we would have that 1sa =
1sa W 1sa0 = 10sa. Thus, right identities are unique. A similar argument shows left identities to also be
unique.
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Since we can thus explain which ways of combining two things to make a third are the
associative ones that admit both a left and a right identity for each element without
even quantifying over collections, surely we can understand this without relying on a
theory of collections.
Altogether, then, it seems if we justify set theory's status as an autonomous founda-
tion by claiming (1) is suciently denite to serve as the subject matter of set theory,
then we can also justify CCAF as an autonomous foundation by claiming (2) is su-
ciently denite to serve as the subject matter of that theory.
The proponent of set theory may at this point wish to go down another road alto-
gether and say the reason (1) is an acceptable identication of the content of set theory
is because it relies only on purely logical notions. That is, \a collection of things" {
which, it would seem, is the result when one does some collecting { can be understood
by simply grasping what it means for an object to hold a particular property { the
collecting the blahs is just gathering up all those x's for which \x is a blah" is a truth.
If this is the road the set theorist goes down, it is extremely dicult to see how she
will block the CCAF theorist from taking the same path. A proponent of CCAF can do
this most easily by pointing out that \ways of combining two things to make a third"
can be perfectly well explained in terms of ternary relations. Thus, if the set theorist
is allowed to claim set theory as an autonomous foundation because the content of set
theory can be grasped using pure logic, then it seems the CCAF theorist should be
allowed to make the same claim { unless the set theorist has some reason to claim that
properties are logical while ternary relations are not.
1.4 Objection 3
Finally, the set theorist can object to (2) as a characterization of the subject matter of
CCAF on the grounds that, in addition to categories, CCAF contains further elements
known as functors, and unless one can describe what functors are, one has only succeeded
in giving a description of part of the content of the CCAF axioms. This, however, is
easily accommodated: a functor is just a way of associating one thing to another.
Actually, just as with \way of associating two things to make a third", we need a few
extra details here. In words, we have the following:
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Given two ways of combining two things to make a third 1 and 2, a functor
f from the rst way to the second is a way of associating combinees from the
rst way to combinees from the second way such that f(a1b) = f(a)2f(b).
That is, such that one associates to the result of combining (in the rst sense)
two things the same thing that results from combining (in the second sense)
what one has associated the two things to.
As with \ways of combining two things to make a third", \ways of associating one
thing to another" avoids both Objection 1 and Objection 2. CCAF is then a combined
rst-order theory describing certain ways of combining two things to make a third and
ways of associating one thing to another.
Conclusion
Of course, Linnebo and Pettigrew's arguments are closely related to arguments in [8]
that have been revisited repeatedly. A summary of \the ways in which Feferman's (1977)
arguments have been used (and misused) in the philosophical literature" can be found
in [9]. While the argument above may appear to merely contribute to this collection of
uses (and hopefully not to the misuses), it should be pointed out that one can read in
the argument I have oered an agreement with Feferman's basic point that \the general
concepts of operation and collection have logical priority with respect to structural
notions." Admittedly, the agreement is rather tenuous, as the theory proposed above
seems to do Feferman one better by relying only on a previous understanding of the
general concept of an operation. Nonetheless, I can agree to \the general concepts of
operation and collection" having logical priority while still maintaining that this leaves
set theory and category theory on equal footing as regards their contentfulness; the
dierence between the two cases amounts only to the following: where the operation
assumed in set-theoretic foundations is a binary membership relation, the operation
assumed in category-theoretic foundations is a ternary composition relation. Thus, if
set theory is taken to avoid LDO and if, to the extent that it does so, set theoretic
foundations are to be labeled as autonomous (in the sense of Linnebo and Pettigrew),
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category theoretic foundations should be given the same honors.5
The lesson to be learned from all this is that remaining silent sometimes is a perfectly
ne answer. The mere fact that the things the set theorist likes to talk about are things
the category theorist does not nd interesting does not make the category theorist's
contributions dependent on the set theorist's { not everyone has to have something to
say about sets.
5 Feferman, of course, famously rejects both impredicative set theoretic foundations as well as
category theoretic foundations. So he might be willing to make this concession without seeing it as
giving up very much.
Chapter 2
Categories for the Neologicist
Abstraction principles provide implicit denitions of mathematical objects. In this
paper, an abstraction principle dening categories is proposed. It is unsatisable and
inconsistent in the expected ways. Two restricted versions of the principle which are
consistent are presented.
2.1 Abstractionism
An abstraction principle is a sentence with the following syntactic form:
8A8B(f(A) = f(B)() Ef (A;B))
Where A and B are of the same logical type, f is a term-forming operator and Ef is
a 2-place predicate dening an equivalence relation on entities of the type of A and B.
Such sentences are taken to dene the mapping represented by the operator f and, via
this, the objects that occur in its range.
Being more careful, we observe that in set-based models for an abstraction principle,
the operator f will be modeled by a function from entities of the appropriate type to the
domain of the model. Objects in the range of this function are identied exactly when
they are images of entities that are related by the equivalence relation represented by
the two-place predicate Ef . Thus, the abstraction principle gives (at least something
very like) identity conditions for the objects occurring in the range of the mapping
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picked out by f .1 These identity conditions, in turn, provide an implicit denition of
these objects { an implicit denition that, importantly, relies for its intelligibility only
on the intelligibility of the vocabulary used in forming Ef . Thus, if we can produce an
abstraction principle wherein the vocabulary occurring in Ef has a privileged epistemic
status { if, for example, there is reason to believe that we can come to know what
sentences in that vocabulary mean purely in terms of the meaning of the components
of such sentences, and we have reason to belive we can come to know the meaning of
the basic components of these sentences in some highly secure way { then the fact that
there is such an implicit denition can help to explain the privileged epistemic status
of our knowledge regarding the objects dened by that abstraction operator.2
One may well worry whether such grand plans are likely to reach fruition. The sur-
prising answer is a resounding yes! Two well-known examples of abstraction principles
will help make this point: Hume's Principle (HP), and Frege's infamous Basic Law V
(BLV):
HP:8X8Y (#(X) = #(Y )() X bijects with Y )3
BLV:8X8Y (x(X) = x(Y )() 8z(Xz () Y z))
Let THP be the theory that takes HP as its lone non-logical axiom, working in
a background logic containing at least second-order logic with the full comprehension
scheme. Let PA2 be second order Peano arithmetic. What is known as Frege's Theorem
(see, e.g. [22, 23]) tells us there is a translation of (the language of) PA2 into (the
language of) THP such that the translation of every axiom of PA
2 is a theorem of THP.
What is known as Boolos' Theorem (see, e.g. [24]) gives the converse result: there is
a translation of THP into the language of PA
2 such that the translation of each THP-
theorem is a theorem of PA2. Further, it can be shown that the composition of these
translations maps each sentence  to a sentence equivalent to . So HP serves as an
implicit denition of numbers (more carefully: of Peano-numbers, or Peano-cardinals)
that relies for its intelligibility only on the vocabulary of second-order logic.
1 A good exposition of the neologicist programme that emphasizes the precise nature of the identity
conditions they provide is found in [19].
2 Further discussions of abstractionism, the status of abstraction principles as implicit denitions,
and the role of second order logic can be found in [20] and [21]
3 Note that a 2-place \bijects with" predicate can be encoded entirely in second-order logic.
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BLV, on the other hand, is well-known to be inconsistent. With a bit of tinkering,
one can easily see that in a standard model of BLV in a domain D, the function x would
be an injection from the set of all subsets of the domain of the model into the domain
of the model. Such an injection is of course impossible, by Cantor's theorem. This is
a typical problem with abstraction principles (we will encounter it again below): if the
equivalence relation Ef is too ne grained, no function f can satisfy every instance of
the biconditional. For BLV, however, there is a partial workaround for this problem.
In place of BLV, one can instead use principles (typically referred to in the literature
(e.g. [25]) as \NewV"-type principles) of a slight dierent form that are consistent and
which give rise to relatively powerful versions of set theory. In general, given a second-
order (but purely logical) predicate \Small" holding of (intuitively) of those concepts
under which only a small fragment of the domain of quantication falls, a \NewV"-type
principle looks like
NewV:8X8Y (x(X) = x(Y )() [:(Small(X) _ Small(Y )) _ 8z(Xz () Y z)])
So while BLV itself will not work to found our knowledge of set theory, NewV-type
principles serve as implicit denitions of (suciently small) sets, and rely for their
intelligibility only the vocabulary of second-order logic.
These successes motivate further investigation of abstraction principles despite the
need to qualify the success of BLV. Indeed, HP seems to give a much more natural
denition of number than PA2 does, and to do so in a vocabulary (that of second-order
logic) that it is not unreasonable to suppose we have some type of privileged epistemic
access to. Further, it is a remarkable mathematical fact that this one natural-feeling
axiom can provide, all by itself, a theory bi-interpretable with PA2.
One needn't have logicist inclinations to nd projects like these interesting. From a
metaphysical and mathematical point of view, abstraction principles \work" by propos-
ing identity conditions for abstract objects. In the cases that are of interest one can
prove { using (usually second-order) logic and the specied identity conditions { that
the objects implicitly dened by an abstraction principle have all the properties they
are \supposed to" have. When this is possible, we have reason to believe the iden-
tity conditions proposed specify something like the essential features of the objects in
question.
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It is thus a generally worthwhile project to produce abstraction principles that im-
plicitly dene objects that can be proved to have all the features the objects in some
specied family of mathematical objects are supposed to have. That is, given a type t of
mathematical object, it is philosophically valuable to produce an abstraction principle
At for which both of the following hold:
 The objects implicitly dened by At can be shown, in the theory generated by At,
to have all the features objects of type t are supposed to have, and
 For either all or at least a substantial portion of the objects x of type t, there cor-
responds an object xA among those objects implicitly dened by At that exhibits
all the features of x.
Thus, for example, the objects implicitly dened by HP have, by Frege and Boolos'
theorems, exactly the features we expect Peano-numbers to have, satisfying the rst
condition. Further, one sees (e.g. by a \bootstrapping" argument like that in [26,
pp. 133]) that models of HP always contain innitely many numbers, satisfying the
second condition. We thus have reason to believe that HP captures something like the
essential features of the number concept.
One might still wonder, after doing this, whether the objects implicitly dened by
At are actually the objects of type t. This, unfortunately, is an issue that has plagued
logicism from the beginning { the so-called Casesar Problem. It would take us rather far
aeld to address this issue, so we won't. Instead, I will point out the following: whether
the objects implicitly dened by At are actually the objects of type t or not, the very fact
that At provides us with identity conditions for objects that provably behave just like
the objects of type t { and that this can be done entirely in the vocabulary of second-
order logic { is a signicant philosophical and mathematical insight. It suggests, again,
that the identity conditions pointed out mark something like the essential features of
the objects in question.
In the remainder of the paper, I seek and propose an abstraction principle, the
objects of which behave (in standard set-based models) just like categories. In doing
so, I will work, as is standard in the neologicist literature, in a set theoretic metatheory.
This dependence4 on set theory in the metatheory is a weakness of neologicism in its
4 [27] contains a very explicit explanation of this dependence. It is treated in detail in [28].
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current state { a ladder that should eventually be kicked away. The philosophical value
of nding such a principle is analogous to the philosophical value of the relationship
between number and equinumerosity established by Frege and Boolos' theorem: nding
such a principle gives us reason to believe we've found something like the essential
features of categories.
2.2 Denitions and Important Examples
Recall that in the standard denition, a category C consists of the following:
 A collection of objects Ob C;
 For each (A;B) 2 Ob C Ob C a collection Mor (A;B) called the morphisms from
A to B; and
 An associative operation that assigns to each (;  ) 2 Mor(B;C) Mor(A;B) a
morphism    2 Mor (A;C) called the composite of  and  .
We further require for each A 2 Ob C a morphism 1A 2 Mor (A;A) so that for any
object B and  2 Mor (A;B),   1A = , and for any object C and  2 Mor (C;A),
1A   =  .
Typical examples of categories include the category with sets for objects and func-
tions for morphisms; categories with structures of various sorts (e.g. groups, rings,
Hopf algebras, etc.) for objects and structure-preserving mappings among such for
morphisms; and categories with spaces of some sort (topological, smooth, Ck, C!, etc.)
for objects and suciently well-behaved maps for morphisms. Another class of cate-
gories important for our purposes is the class of poset categories.
2.2.1 Poset Categories
A poset is a set P together with a reexive, transitive, antisymmetric relation  on P .
Given a poset (P;), we dene a category P as follows:
 ObP = P ;
 The collection of morphisms between objects a and b is empty when a 6 b, and
has one element (which we call pa  bq) when a  b.
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 pb  cq  pa  bq = pa  cq
The cardinality of the set of morphisms in the poset category  associated to an
ordinal  will be important to us later. (For  = 4 = f0; 1; 2; 3g, a picture of  is
presented in Figure 2.1.) We count the morphisms in such a category by adding up
the number of morphisms leaving each object as we range from the rst object to the
last { that is, for an arbitrary ordinal  the cardinality of the set of morphisms in 
is
P
< j   j. If  is innite and we assume choice (which we do throughout this
paper), then this is simply jj.
Figure 2.1: The poset category associated to the ordinal 4
2.2.2 When are Categories the Same?
We now turn to determining the appropriate category-theoretic identity conditions to
impose on the objects dened above. This task is worth pausing to consider: in many
mathematical practices, there is a readily apparent bifurcation of identity conditions:
on the one hand, the foundational role played by set theory demands we dene ob-
jects in such a way that many non-identical but isomorphic objects exist; on the other,
most mathematical practices are actually only interested in studying the isomorphism-
invariant features of the objects it considers. In practice, in fact, the objects quantied
over by many sentences in many mathematical theories seem to either be or at least
correspond to isomorphism-classes of objects given by the foundational constructions of
that theory. For example, there is the (in)famous Atlas of Finite Groups [29]. Notice
the title of this work is not \Atlas of isomorphism-classes of nite groups." The neo-
logicist can make sense of this omission in a particularly parsimonious way: abstraction
principles allow us to produce, corresponding to what the set-theoretic foundationalist
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would call, e.g. the isomorphism class of nite simple groups of order two, an individual
object naturally labeled the nite simple group of order two.
We should thus examine category-theoretic practice to determine what the appropri-
ate identity conditions are on categories for the working category-theorist. On inspec-
tion, one nds there are two candidate relations among categories to consider: isomor-
phism and equivalence. Categories C and D are isomorphic when there is an invertible
structure-preserving map between them { that is, when there is an object-to-object and
morphism-to-morphism map F : C ! D that preserves all categorial structure and for
which the inverse map F 1 : D ! C also preserves all categorial structure. On the other
hand, category C is equivalent to category D when there are structure-preserving maps
F : C ! D and G : D ! C and morphisms ix : G F(x)! x for each object x of C such
that each ix is invertible in C. Equivalence is a strictly looser relation than isomorphism
{ categories that are isomorphic are equivalent, since we can take the maps ix to be the
identity map in each case.
In practice, the notion of equivalence suces for almost all standard applications
of category theory. Despite this, it is more philosophically appropriate for the abstrac-
tionist to { at least at this early stage { use the former, stricter notion for her project,
since it is occasionally important in practice that there exist non-isomorphic, equivalent
categories. It would be philosophically worthwhile, however, to produce an abstraction
principle that implicitly denes objects corresponding to categories identied only up
to equivalence, rather than up to isomorphism. This project is likely to be pursued in
future work.
2.3 BLC
The initial challenge: any formalization of the denition of a category (in particular via
an abstraction principle) seems to demand language allowing separate quantication
over objects and over morphisms. A language with more than one type of rst-order
variable for example would seem to allow such exibility by letting us specify, using
distinct quantiers, the assumptions that must be made regarding the behavior of the
objects and the behavior of the morphisms.
But for the neologicist it is not a trivial matter to adopt a new language. As pointed
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out above, an important part of the success of the abstractionist programme relies
on the vocabulary occurring in the equivalence relations having a privileged epistemic
status. Such privileging demands careful argumentation to justify, and cannot easily be
transferred from one language to the next.
We should thus seek, if possible, to build the theory of categorial abstraction without
leaving \standard" second order logic. It turns out that this is possible because no
category-theoretic information is lost if we allow the role of objects to be played by
identity morphisms. This allows us to work in a standard language for second-order
logic containing only one type of rst-order quantier.5 For completeness, we next
present an explicit morphism-only denition of categories.
2.3.1 Categories Without Objects
With reference only to morphisms, we dene a category to be a triple consisting of a
collection M , a designated subcollection Comp M M and a mapping  : Comp  !
M all subject to the following:6
(CWO1) If (a; b) and (b; c) are both in Comp, then ((a; b); c) and (a; (b; c)) are in
Comp as well and ((a; b); c) = (a; (b; c))
(CWO2) If a 2M then there are elements 1Da and 1Ca 2M that satisfy the following:
(R1) (a; 1Da) and (1Da; 1Da) are both in Comp;
(R2) If (x; 1Da) 2 Comp then (x; 1Da) = x; and
(R3) If (1Da; x) 2 Comp then (1Da; x) = x. Also,
(L1) (1Ca; a) and (1Ca; 1Ca) are both in Comp;
(L2) If (1Ca; x) 2 Comp then (1Ca; x) = x; and
(L3) If (x; 1Ca) 2 Comp then (x; 1Ca) = x.
The collection M is to be thought of as the collection of morphisms of some category,
Comp as specifying which morphisms compose, and  as the composition itself. Each
5 Note that this idea dates to the origins of category theory in [18].
6 The words \collection" and \mapping" are meant to be more general than the more standard
\set", \function" { no restriction in size is supposed at this point in the essay.
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a 2 M is (intuitively) a morphism, so each a intuitively has a domain (where it comes
from) and a codomain (where it goes to). In terms only of morphisms and composition,
this means that each a 2M admits a left-composition-identity and a right-composition-
identity. CWO2 guarantees the existence of an element 1Da that plays the \right-
composition-identity for a"-role (thus, intuitively, the role of the identity morphism
at the domain of a). Similarly, 1Ca plays the role of the left-composition-identity for
a (thus, intuitively, of the identity morphism at the codomain of a). Notice it is a
consequence of CWO2 that  is a surjection. Thus, specifying  suces to specify both
Comp and M . So each category, from the morphism-only point of view, corresponds to
a type of two-place mapping.
Of course, specifying that the category have some particular familyM of morphisms
{ or, correspondingly, that it be identied with a particular mapping  { is not par-
ticularly faithful to category-theoretic practice. It would be akin, in group theoretic
practice, to demanding that the group theorist tell you precisely what the elements of
the Klein four group are before she tell you anything further about its features (are they
the numbers 0, 1, 2, and 3? The ordered pairs (0; 0), (0; 1), (1; 0) and (1; 1)? Etc.).
As we mentioned above, in category-theoretic practice, such objects are considered to
be \the same" object when they are isomorphic (or equivalent, but we've agreed to use
the stricter notion for the time being). Put more simply, the correspondence between
categories (as that term is used in practice) and two-place functions is one-to-many.
2.3.2 The Abstraction Principle
Our goal is to produce an abstraction principle that implicitly denes objects corre-
sponding to categories as the term \category" is used in category-theoretic practice.
Given that we've seen the correspondence between categories and two-place mappings
is one-many, we can expect that the abstraction principle will have the following fea-
tures:
 The variables at the front-end of the abstraction principle should range over two-
place functions,
 There will be two conditions such functions must satisfy in order that we say they
correspond to the same category
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{ They must each satisfy conditions corresponding to (CWO1) and (CWO2),
and
{ They must be isomorphic.
So, to produce such an abstraction principle, we will need to build two predicates:
 A one-place predicate Ax such that Ax(f) holds exactly when f is a mapping that
represents the composition in a category, and
 A two-place predicate Iso dening the equivalence relation separating the two-
place functions into category isomorphism classes.
Once we do this, we expect that our abstraction principle will have the following
general form:
(8f)(8g)
h
Cat(f) = Cat(g) !
 :Ax(f) ^ :Ax(g) _ Iso(f; g)i
Where the variables f and g are of 2-place-function type;7
In the remainder of the section, we construct the predicates Ax and Iso. There are
in fact three related predicates that we construct along the way: ax, Ax, and Mdom.
Their intuitive meanings are presented in Figure 2.3.2. The reader may nd it helpful to
refer back to this chart in the course of reading the technical construction that follows.
Expression Intuitive Meaning
ax(f; P ) f , restricted to the objects falling under P , behaves like the composi-
tion of a category.
Ax(f) There is a unique maximal concept P such that f satises ax(f; P ).
Mdom(P; f) P is the unique maximal concept such that f satises ax(f; P ).
Figure 2.2: Some Useful Translations
2.3.3 Building Ax
The rst step is to build the predicate Ax. We begin with a discussion of identity
morphisms. (CWO2) tells us how these ought to behave. We focus on left-identities
rst; right identities will be similar.
7 Note that this does not mean f and g range over 2-place functions, but that the syntactic type of
these variables is that of 2-place functions. One can, of course, choose a model in which such variables
range over a much broader (or narrower!) class of entities than mere 2-place functions.
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As a nave rst guess, we could try to formalize \every morphism has a left-identity"
by the sentence
(8x)(9y)[f(y; x) = x] (2.1)
Intuitively, (2.1) guarantees every morphism x has a corresponding morphism y that is
a left identity for it. Unfortunately, y being a left identity for x does not fully capture
what it means for y to be the identity morphism at the codomain of x, as the following
example demonstrates:8
Consider the \almost category" A with ObA = fRNg and Mor(RN;RN) = figi2N,
where
i(f)(n) =
(
f(n) : n < i
0 : n  i
and with composition dened as usual.
Notice for any j > i, j i = i j = i, so A models the axiom (8x)(9y)[(y; x) =
x] and its obvious right-hand counterpart. But A lacks a genuine identity morphism
because no i is an identity morphism for all the j . So satisfying (1) is not the same
as satisfying the conclusions of either (L2) or (L3).
A natural second candidate axiom is the following emendation of (2.1):
(8x)(9y)[f(y; x) = x ^ (8z)(f(y; z) = z _ f(z; y) = z)] (2.2)
Sentence (2.2) does solve the particular problem presented by A, but it has new problems
all its own.
Recalling that f is supposed to represent the composition in an arbitrary category,
we can see that these problems stem from the following general issue: even when y is
an identity morphism, we should not demand f(y; z) and f(z; y) be z for all z, but only
for those z that y in fact composes with { in general there will be many morphisms z
for which f(y; z) is simply undened. Notice, in particular, that (L2) and (L3) each
explicitly contain this as their antecedent. So, given category C represented by mapping
f , and given identity morphism y and arbitrary morphism z, we should have that either
f(y; z) = z, or y and z don't compose in C (and similarly for f(z; y)). For now we write
8 Imposing (1) also does not guarantee identity morphisms be unique, but in elementary cate-
gory theory identity morphisms are proved unique using associativity and the denition of identity
morphisms, so it is natural to ignore this problem until after treating associativity.
29
f(y; z) = ? to mean \y and z don't compose (in this order) in the category represented
by f ."
Incorporating this, the assertion that identities exist seems captured by
(8x)(9y)
h
f(y; x) = x^ (8z)(f(y; z) = z_ f(y; z) = ?)^ (8z)(f(z; y) = z_ f(z; y) = ?)
i
(2.3)
A subtle problem remains: Notice (3) clearly gives us that if y is an identity mor-
phism then either f(y; y) = y or f(y; y) = ?. But the latter option is incompatible with
y being an identity morphism, since (L1) species that identity-morphisms do in fact
compose with themselves.
We could just adopt f(y; y) 6= ? as an axiom to resolve this, but given we use ? to
mean \doesn't compose" we really ought to have that for any x, f(?; x) = ?. That is,
it is natural to take as an axiom the sentence
(8x)[f(x;?) = ? ^ f(?; x) = ?];
Which rules out a host of pathologies, among which are non-looping identity morphisms.
Since right identities will be analogous to left these considerations suce to deter-
mine our rst three axioms:
(I) (8x)[f(x;?) = ? ^ f(?; x) = ?]
(II) (8x)(9y)
h
f(y; x) = x ^ (8z)(f(y; z) = z _ f(y; z) = ?)
^(8z)(f(z; y) = z_f(z; y) = ?)
i
(III) (8x)(9y)
h
f(x; y) = x ^ (8z)(f(y; z) = z _ f(y; z) = ?)
^(8z)(f(z; y) = z_f(z; y) = ?)
i
Together these ensure that identity morphisms behave appropriately. A formal proof of
part of this fact is given in Figure 2.3 on page 31. We next deal with (CWO1).
The conditions under which the composite of  and  is dened are captured by the
diagram
 //
i
  //
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Translating from diagram-ese to English, this says it makes sense to talk about the
composite    if and only if there is an morphism i that is both the left identity for
 and the right identity for . Formalizing, we arrive at our penultimate axiom:
(IV) (8x)(8y)[(9i)(Ridf (i; x) ^ Lidf (i; y)) ! f(y; x) 6= ?]
Where Lidf (x; y) and Ridf (x; y) stand for the unquantied versions of axioms (II) and
(III), respectively. Associativity is then what we expect it to be:
(V) (8x)(8y)(8z)[f(f(x; y); z) = f(x; f(y; z))]
Finally, we dene Lid and Rid in a ?-free way by restricting everything to just the
objects falling under a particular predicate P :
LidP;f (a; b) :=
h
Pb ^ f(b; a) = a ^ (8z)(f(b; z) = z _ :Pf(b; z))
^ (8z)(f(z; b) = z _ :Pf(z; b))
i
RidP;f (a; b) :=
h
Pb ^ f(a; b) = a ^ (8z)(f(z; b) = z _ :Pf(b; y))
^ (8z)(f(b; z) = z _ :Pf(b; z))
i
Extending this trick, we can express all ve axioms in a ?-free way, giving us
(I) (8x)(8y)[:Py  ! (:Pf(x; y) ^ :Pf(y; x)]
(II) (8x)fPx  ! (9y)[LidP;f (x; y)]g
(III) (8x)fPx  ! (9y)[RidP;f (x; y)]g
(IV) (8x)(8y)f(Px ^ Py)  ! [(9i)(RidP;f (i; x) ^ LidP;f (i; y)) ! Pf(y; x)]g
(V) (8x)(8y)(8z)[(Pf(x; y) ^ Pf(y; z))  ! f(f(x; y); z) = f(x; f(y; z))]
Dene ax(f; P ) (intuitively, f denes a category over P ) to be the conjunction of
the axioms. For \the" category dened by f , we then dene
Ax(f) := (9P )(ax(f; P ) ^ (8Q)(ax(f;Q)  ! (8x)(Qx  ! Px)))
That is, we dene f to be a \category mapping" just when there is a unique maximal
set on which f behaves like a category.
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1 LidP;f (a; b) ^ Pa
2 Pb Unpacking, 1
3 f(b; a) = a Unpacking, 1
4 (8z)(f(b; z) = z _ :Pf(b; z)) Unpacking, 1
5 f(b; b) = b _ :Pf(b; b) Inst. at z = b, 4
6 :Pf(b; b) Assump. for Reductio
7 f(f(b; b); a) = f(b; f(b; a)) Axiom V
8 f(f(b; b); a) = f(b; a) Replacement, 3, 6
9 f(f(b; b); a) = a Replacement, 3
10 :Pf(b; b)  ! (:Pf(a; f(b; b)) ^ :P (f(b; b); a)) Axiom I
11 :P (f(b; b); a)) Unpacking, 10
12 :Pa Replacement, 9, 11
13 Pa Assumption, 1
14 Pf(b; b) Reductio, 7{10
15 f(b; b) = b Disj. Syllogism, 5, 14
Figure 2.3: Proof that Left Identities are Loops
2.3.4 Building Iso
We now building the predicate Iso that corresponds, intuitively, the the notion of iso-
morphism between functions that represent the same category.
To begin, we introduce the abbreviation InvP;Q(f; g) (intuitively read \f and g are
inverses as functions between P and Q") for
(8x)

[Px  ! (Qf(x) ^ g(f(x)) = x)] ^ [Qx  ! (Pg(x) ^ f(g(x)) = x)]

:
Recall a functor is a composition-preserving map from morphisms to morphisms and
objects to objects. In a category without objects, a functor is thus simply a map that
preserves composition. If we abbreviate \h is a functor from the category (P; f) to the
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category (Q; g)" by Funf;gP;Q(h), then we have
Funf;gP;Q(h) := (8x)(8y)

(Px ^ Py)  ! [Qh(x) ^Qh(y) ^ h(f(x; y)) = g(h(x); h(y))]

To make things easier later, we also introduce the following abbreviation:
Mdom(P; f) := ax(P; f) ^ (8Q)[ax(f;Q)  ! (8x)(Qx  ! Px)]
Intuitively we read Mdom(P; f) as \P is the maximal domain on which f behaves like
a category." The phrase \f and g dene isomorphic categories," abbreviated Iso(f; g),
is then dened by
(8P )(8Q)

[Mdom(P; f)^Mdom(Q; g)]  !
(9h)(9j)[Funf;gP;Q(h) ^ Fung;fQ;P (j) ^ InvP;Q(h; j)]

2.3.5 Dening Cat
Given all of the preceding technical work, we can now (re-)introduce the category ab-
straction principle, which looks just as we expected it would:
BLC := (8f)(8g)
h
Cat(f) = Cat(g) !
 :Ax(f) ^ :Ax(g) _ Iso(f; g)i
Of course, BLC cannot be modeled in any model of set theory as it stands { Iso is
simply too ne-grained a way of discriminating among two-place functions. I give an
argument modeled on the Burali-Forti paradox to demonstrate this.9
Suppose we are given a domain D with cardinality  that might model BLC. Each
ordinal  with cardinality no more than  denes a poset category with no more than 
morphisms (this follows from the combinatorial calculation above). For distinct ordinals
these categories are non-isomorphic, so the cardinality of the class of categories produced
by this abstraction operator (more carefully { of the class of distinct objects that must
9 This demonstration that BLC is inconsistent is, of course, somewhat suspect, being only a demon-
stration that it simply has no models in set theory. Better would be to derive an actual contradiction
from BLC. To do this, however, we would have to specify a system of axioms for second-order logic,
and \unpack" the denitions { both of which would be rather large endeavors. Conveniently, since BLC
was meant to capture the notion of a category given as a type of mapping, and since we are operating
in a set-theoretic metatheory, the demonstration that no set theory can model it will suce to convince
the reader we should seek some emendation of the principle.
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be in the range of the Cat operator when modeled in D) is at least as large as the
cardinality of the class S of ordinals with cardinality less than or equal to . But S,
then, is itself an ordinal, and since S 62 S, S has cardinality greater than .
2.4 \New" C
Since the abstraction principle we've produced treats categories like a type of function,
the tricks the neologicists have used when constructing consistent \NewV"-type ab-
straction principles seem to not apply. So at rst blush we might think we need some
exciting new theory of function abstraction on hand in order to build a consistent ver-
sion of BLC. But from a category-theoretic perspective, there are two other approaches
worth trying rst: we could look at what happens if we restrict the abstraction princi-
ple so all the categories it produces only have a \small" number of objects, or we could
restrict so that between any two objects there is only a \small" number of morphisms.
I show now that neither of these suce alone to allow a consistent category-abstraction
principle, even if \small" means \of cardinality one."10
Regarding the rst case, recall that a monoid is a set equipped with an associative
law of composition that admits an identity. It is clear on inspection that there is a
bijection between isomorphism classes of monoids and isomorphism classes of categories
with one object. Thus, in any domain, there are as many isomorphism classes of monoids
modelable in that domain as there are isomorphism classes of categories with one object.
However, in a domain of cardinality , there are more than  isomorphism classes of
monoids. Thus even if we demand our categories have only a single object, BLC will
still be unsatisable.
On the other hand, if we put no restriction on the objects at all and only demand
the set of morphisms between any two objects be small, then even if small means \of
cardinality no more than one" we still get too many categories. To see this, recall
the poset category associated to an ordinal has, between any two objects, either one
morphism or none. But, as above, there are too many ordinals on any given domain
to introduce an object for each of them. Since the ordinals are among the posets, this
suces to show there are too many posets on a given domain to introduce an object for
10 I remind the reader that the metatheory throughout is set-theoretic.
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each of them.
So any restriction of this general type must restrict both the total number of objects
and the total number of morphisms that occur between any two objects. In morphisms-
only talk, that is, we must restrict both the number of identity and number of non-
identity morphisms. A survey of the category theory literature, of course, reveals that
this is not a surprising fact { the standard denition of a \small category" is a category
with both a small collection of objects and a small collection of morphisms { that is, a
category for which both the collection of objects and the collection of morphisms are
actually sets. A similar condition that suces to give a consistent version of BLC is
that the total number of morphisms in the category be small, as we now demonstrate.
To this end, we introduce a dened predicate SMD that holds of functions. Intu-
itively, SMD(f) means f has a small maximal domain on which it behaves like a category.
For various interpretations of \small," then, we can introduce \NewC" principles of the
form
(8f)(8g)
h
Cat(f) =Cat(g) ! :(Ax(f) ^ SMD(f)) _ :(Ax(g) ^ SMD(g)) _ Iso(f; g)i
For appropriate \smallnesses", this principle is satisable. I close the technical portion
of the paper by demonstrating this by presenting two interpretations of \small" that
allow us to easily see NewC, with the appropriate interpretation of \small", can be
modeled.
2.4.1 Small=Finite
Suppose \small" means nite, so SMD(f) means the maximal domain on which f be-
haves like a category is nite. Call the resulting principle BLCFin. Then if the cardi-
nality of the universe is , and we let  be the cardinality of the set of distinct objects
in the range of the Cat operator, we have that
 =
1X
i=0
i
2  @0  
So, provided the universe is innite, BLCFin can be modeled.
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2.4.2 Small=Exponentially Small
Recall the phrase \exponentially small" as dened by Fine:
\A cardinal c m is said to be exponentially small (relative to m) if mc 
m"[30]
Suppose \small" means exponentially small relative to the cardinality of the universe.
Call the resulting abstraction principle BLCExpSml. If the cardinality of the universe is
  @0, and we let  be the number of objects in the range of the Cat operator whose
maximal domain has cardinality , we get (for innite )
  (number of -sized subsets of the universe)(22)
 2
 ()2
 
So, if we again let  be the cardinality of the set of objects in the range of the Cat
operator, then
 
0@ X
Exponentially Small Innite 

1A+ X
Finite 

!

0@ X
Exponentially Small Innite 

1A+ 
 
So BLCExpSml can be modeled.
2.5 What Remains to Be Done
So we have an abstraction principle that implicitly denes objects that correspond to
equivalence classes of two-place functions that represent the composition-function of a
category. This should provide the basis for an abstractionist category theory. What
remains is to prove analogs to Frege's Theorem and Boolos' Theorem. That is, given
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some axiomatization A of the theory of categories, what we need is a bi-interpretability
result regarding the theories based, respectively, on one of the NewC-type principles and
on A. Unfortunately, there is no standard axiomatization of the theory of categories, so
this is a rather dicult task.
Specically, what would be needed in order to prove analogs to Frege's and Boolos'
theorems is a theory in the sense of a deductively closed set of sentences, and further
a theory that species precisely which categories exist and what (category-theoretically
relevant) features they have. As [11] points out, however, \as usually presented, cate-
gory theory . . . lacks substantive axioms of mathematical existence."11 (emphasis in
original)
One could attempt to use either the theory given in [2] or the one given in [32] (or
modications of these) to provide such a theory of existence. There are two problems
with this, however. First, both of these theories have suered some criticism. For
example, regarding [2], Hellman points out that
\Doubts as to its consistency were raised early on ([33]), and, indeed, the
stronger axioms of the theory are quite complex. Apparently, subsequent
developments in topos theory overshadowed eorts to axiomatize a category
of categories, but at the cost of suspending the articulation of existence
axioms in the assertory sense, i.e., as credible truths outright rather than as
merely part of an algebraico-structural denition. A detailed assessment of
Lawvere's axioms would examine this issue of credibility, which in turn rests
on some prior, not merely structural, understanding of the primitives and
intended interpretation, which does build in the notion of `category' itself,
and thereby presupposes the notion of `collection' as well as that of `functor'.
(Cf. [34].)"[11, p. 137]
On the other hand, regarding [32], Feferman has pointed out that
\it fails as an actual foundation of working category theory since we can-
not speak within it of such categories as that of all small groups, all small
topological spaces, and even the category of all small categories"[35, p. 8]
11 This much is even granted by the otherwise-quite-criticital [31].
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Despite their seriousness, let us put aside these criticisms for the time. The second
problem still remains: both [2] and [32] axiomatize categories of categories. As a result,
to the extent that they give us theories of existence at all, they give theories of existence
for categories and functors. One might hypothesize that the restriction of one of these
theories (or a modication of it) to those claims it makes about categories alone would
suce as a theory of categories. But this, of course, is no more than an hypothesis, and
a fairly grand one at that { I'd like to see the result before putting faith in it.
All this aside, some general details of how to translate \category-talk" into \NewC-
talk" are nonetheless perfectly clear. To be as explicit as possible, let TNewC be the
second-order theory based on a NewC-type abstraction principle, and let TA be a theory
based on an appropriate axiomatization of category theory. Claims of the form \All
morphisms in category X satisfying condition  have feature  " occurring in TA will be
translated into TNewC as
8f(X = Cat(f)! ((a 2 Mdom(f) ^ T ()(a))! T ( )(a))
Where T is an appropriate translation from the language of TA to the language of
TNewC.
12 A similar translation will work for claims of the form \there is a morphism
in X...".
To make this procedure more concrete and to produce specic translations to and
from TNewC, we would need, again, to settle on a specic axiomatization of the theory
of categories. It should be clear from the sketch just provided and from the examples
given by Frege and Boolos' Theorems roughly how such a procedure would go, were we
equipped with a generally accepted axiomatization of category theory.
Finally, a last bit of work that remains is the determination of precisely which NewC-
type abstraction principle is appropriate. Determining this will have to be done with an
eye to the general size of categories in fact used in category-theoretic practice, a topic
that is, at this point, the subject of further investigation (see e.g. [36]).
12 In general, we should note, discussion of the behavior of particular arrows in a category will not
be possible unless that arrow can be singled out as the unique morphism satisfying some condition .
But this is to be expected { we are providing a neologicist version of the theory of categories, not the
theory of morphisms, and morphisms are only dened relative to the category they are in.
Chapter 3
Abstractionist Categories of
Categories
If C is a category whose objects are themselves categories, and C has a rich enough
structure, it is known that we can recover the internal structure of the categories in C
entirely in terms of the arrows in C. In this sense, the internal structure of the categories
in a rich enough category of categories is visible in the structure of the category of
categories itself.
In this paper, we demonstrate that this result follows as a matter of logic { given one
starts from the right denitions. This is demonstrated by rst producing an abstrac-
tion principle whose abstracts are functors, and then actually recovering the internal
structure of the individual categories that intuitively stand at the sources and targets of
these functors by examining the way these functors interact. The technique used in this
construction will be useful elsewhere, and involves providing an abstract corresponding
not to every object of some given family, but to all the relevant mappings of some family
of objects.
This construction should shed light, in particular, on questions about whether cat-
egories of categories qualify as autonomous mathematical objects { if admitting a ne-
ologicist denition qualies a mathematical object as autonomous, then categories of
categories are perfectly acceptable autonomous objects and thus, in particular, suitable
for foundational purposes.
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3.1 Introduction
One thing that stands out as a dierence between a structure like a large category of
small categories compared to a structure like a class of sets is the apparently greater
amount of internal structure the objects inside the former have. In particular, it seems as
if the objects (small categories) out of which the large category is formed have sucient
structure that one would need a fair amount of mathematics already in place in order
to describe them. This very fact has occasionally led some writers (see, for example,
[8], [10]) to label categories of categories as unsuitable for foundational purposes. As
pointed out in [1], these objections centrally concern category theory's autonomy { to
understand what a category of categories is, it is claimed, you need to understand their
internal structure and to understand this, in turn, an alternative mathematical theory
is needed. So category theory is non-autonomous, thus unsuitable for foundational
purposes.
In the technical construction that follows, we demonstrate that all internal structure
categories are supposed to have can be recovered in terms of external features embodied
by categories of categories, and { the novel part of this contribution { that this can
be done as a matter of logic. We turn, in the remainder of the introduction, to briey
outlining the abstractionist programme.
3.1.1 Abstractionism
An abstraction principle is a sentence with the following syntactic form:
8A8B((A) = (B)() Ef (A;B))
Where A and B are of the same logical type t and E is a 2-place predicate that names
an equivalence relation on entities of type t. , in turn, is what is usually called a t-
functor. That is,  is a syntactic object that is saturated by an entity of type t and that,
when so saturated, becomes a name for an object. An example of such a (intuitively
unnatural sounding) thing is given by the phrase \the number of". This phrase is a
syntactic object that is saturated by a concept and that, when so saturated, becomes a
name of a number.
Of course, given our project, we will have need later of the word \functor" to mean
something quite dierent from this. So we will adopt a word other than \functor" to
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refer to the type of thing  is. We will use \correspondence" to play this role, so 
will be called a \correspondence between entities of type t and objects" rather than a
\t-functor" in what follows.
Now, given a language L together with a consequence relation holding among the
sentences of L, and a particular abstraction principle A in the language of L, we can
consider the theory TA = f 2 L : A g. Let M be a set-based model of TA. Then in
M the correspondence  will be modeled by a function FM from entities of type t to the
domain of M . Further, since A is certainly a part of TA and M models TA, M models
A. Thus FM maps two entities of type t to the same object of the domain exactly
when the two entities satisfy the equivalence relation E. The abstraction principle
thus provides something very like identity conditions for the objects occurring in the
range of FM .
1 These identity conditions, in turn, provide an implicit denition of
these objects { an implicit denition that, importantly, relies for its intelligibility only
on the intelligibility of the vocabulary used in forming Ef . Thus, if we can produce an
abstraction principle wherein the vocabulary occurring in Ef has a privileged epistemic
status { if we can come to know, for example, a priori, or analytically, what sentences
in that vocabulary mean { then the fact that there is such an implicit denition can
help to explain the privileged epistemic status of our knowledge regarding the objects
dened by that abstraction operator.2
Examining an example will help make this more clear. Consider for now the ab-
straction principle HP:
HP : 8X8Y (#(X) = #(Y )() X bijects with Y )3
Let THP be the second-order theory that takes HP as its lone axiom. What is known
as Frege's Theorem (see, e.g. [22, 23]) tells us that there is a translation of the language
of Second Order Peano Arithmetic (PA2) into the language of THP so that the translation
of every PA2-theorem is a THP-theorem. What is known as Boolos' Theorem (see, e.g.
1 A good exposition of the neologicist programme that emphasizes the precise nature of the identity
conditions they provide is found in [19]. The remainder of this section is adapted from [37]
2 Further discussions of abstractionism, the status of abstraction principles as implicit denitions,
and the role of second order logic can be found in [20] and [21]
3 Note that a 2-place \bijects with" predicate can be encoded entirely in second-order logic.
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[24]) gives the converse result: there is a translation from the language of THP to the
language of PA2 such that the translation of every THP-theorem is a PA
2-theorem. So HP
serves as an implicit denition of numbers (more carefully: of Peano-numbers, or Peano-
cardinals) that relies for its intelligibility only on the intelligibility of the vocabulary of
second-order logic.
HP is the great success story for what we will call the abstractionist programme: the
attempt to nd abstraction principles from which the theorems in important branches
of mathematics follow. Unfortunately, HP is, in many respects, an unusual abstraction
principle. To see this, consider another abstraction principle, BLV that seems, at rst
glance, as acceptable as HP:
BLV : 8X8Y (x(X) = x(Y )() 8z(Xz  ! Y z))
BLV is well-known to be inconsistent. With a bit of tinkering, one can easily see that
in a (standard) model of BLV in a domain D, the function x would be an injection from
2D { the set of all subsets of the D {into D. Such an injection is of course impossible,
by Cantor's theorem. This is a typical problem with abstraction principles: if the
equivalence relation E is too ne grained, then in no model M can there be a function
FM that satises every instance of the abstraction principle's biconditional.
Conveniently, for BLV there is a partial workaround for this problem: by appropri-
ately restricting the size of the concepts X and Y for which we demand the biconditional
hold, one can produce principles (typically referred to in the literature (e.g. [25]) as
\NewV"-type principles) that are consistent and which give rise to relatively powerful
versions of set theory. So NewV-type principles serve as implicit denitions of (su-
ciently small) sets, and rely only on the intelligibility of the vocabulary of second-order
logic for their own intelligibility.
These successes motivate further examination of abstraction principles. One needn't
have logicist inclinations to nd such investigations interesting. From a metaphysical
and mathematical point of view, abstraction principles \work" by proposing identity
conditions for abstract objects. In the cases that are of interest one can prove { using
higher-order logic and the specied identity conditions { that the objects implicitly
dened by an abstraction principle have all the properties they are \supposed to" have.
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When this is possible, we have reason to believe the identity conditions proposed specify
something like the essential features of the objects in question. It is thus a generally
worthwhile project to nd, for various \natural families" of mathematical objects, an
appropriately-constructed abstraction principle that realizes them as its abstracts.
Of course, this is rather dicult in general. One diculty is that not all \natural
families" of mathematical objects are well-characterized by identity conditions on the
objects themselves. For some families of objects, the objects themselves are best char-
acterized by instead examining the relations among the other members of the family.
A good example of such \malcontent" objects are categories { one can produce an ab-
straction principle whose abstracts are categories (this is done in [37], which is briey
reviewed below). However, (set-based) models of such an abstraction principle contain,
rather than a category of all small-enough categories (which would be natural), a class
of all small-enough categories. Since the natural family within which categories occur is
the category of categories, it would be better from a philosophical perspective to have
an abstraction principle whose models contained a category of categories, rather than
only a class of categories. In this note we propose such an abstraction principle. The
abstraction methodology used for this purpose is in fact interesting on its own, so worth
briey commenting on.
Our starting point is the observation that, in a rich-enough (large) category of
(small) categories, the internal structure of individual small categories can be read o
of the external structure exhibited by the arrows in the large category. Intuitively,
this means that even if we can't \see" inside the small categories, we can still tell
what's \happening" there just by examining the way a given small category interacts
with the other small categories. This provides the impetus for pursuing what I call a
\relative" abstraction theory for categories: rather than nding an abstraction principle
whose abstracts correspond to the categories directly, our goal is to nd an abstraction
principle whose abstracts correspond to functors, and then to recover the structure of
individual categories by examining the way the functors interact.4 Of course, there
is nothing particularly special about categories that makes them amenable to such a
programme of relative abstraction { many other mathematical objects are susceptible to
4 Such a program is relative in the sense of Grothendieck's relative point of view { to study object
x in category C, study the slice categories C # x of maps to x and C " x of maps from x.
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similar treatment; relative abstraction for categories is simply one example of a possibly
quite general method.
In the next section we ease into relative abstraction by looking at an easier case
{ mappings among sets. This provides us with the outlines of how we expect relative
abstraction for categories to go. In Section 3, we then set about producing abstraction
principles whose abstracts are (intuitively at least) functors. We then demonstrate that
the identity functors in the range of these abstraction operators behave like categories,
and then prove a few theorems about the categories of categories arising from the
abstraction principles of the type produced.
3.2 Relative Abstraction Theory
In just a moment I am going to propose an abstraction principle. Whenever one does
this, the lesson of BLV looms: one must ensure the equivalence relation being used is not
too ne-grained, or inconsistency results. However, for the purposes of this introductory
section, we will ignore inconsistency { whatever that means { and proceed navely. We
will also be somewhat nave in this example about the language in which our abstraction
principle is formulated. I will specify only that the language has variables whose type is
a triple consisting of a function and two properties, and that the abstraction operator
is a correspondence from entities of this type to objects.
This section is meant as a propaedeutic to the functorial abstraction theory found
in section three. Here is the intuitive setup: in many contexts it is useful to distinguish
between functions that have the same domain and the same value on each element of
that domain, but which have dierent codomains. Let's reserve the word \map" for
functions that we distinguish in this way. For example, it is as maps that we distinguish
the identity function on the natural numbers from the inclusion of the natural numbers
into the integers. For simplicity, let's also focus only on the case of one-place maps that
are dened on the entirety of their domain.
Let (f; P;Q) be a variable whose type is a triple consisting of a one-place function and
two concepts. Employing several abbreviations that are suciently clear from context
(and, again, ignoring issues that would arise from this principle's likely inconsistency),
the following abstraction principle (which we will call BLM) will have as its abstracts
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objects that correspond to maps (in the technical sense of that word adopted above).
8(f; P;Q)8(g;R; S)
"
m(f; P;Q) = m(g;R; S),

:P f //Q _ R g //S  _

P
f //Q ^ R g //S ^ 8x([Px, Rx] ^ [Qx, Sx])
^ 8y(Py ) f(y) = g(y))#
In standard set-based models of BLM, the correspondence m will be modeled by a
function M from triples (f;P;Q) { consisting of a one-place total function f on the
domain of the model and two subsets P and Q of the model { to elements of the domain
of the model.5 Given two such triples (f;P;Q) and (g;R;S), M will send them
to the same element of the domain exactly when P = R, Q = S and f agrees with g
everywhere on P. It seems natural, given this, to say the objects that occur in the range
of M simply are mappings in our technical sense.
But there is a problem here: the objects that occur in the range of M are, in an
important sense, simples. They do not \come with" domains or ranges or any obvious
way to apply to objects. Adopting BLM demands only that the things denoted by the
terms m(f; P;Q) be objects and that two such terms denote one and the same object
just when certain other equalities hold. To justify calling these objects \maps," then,
we must rst ensure that BLM alone (or, rather, BLM plus logic) ensures they exhibit the
appropriate sorts of behaviors.
This task, in turn, seems at rst glance to require dening another abstraction
principle to capture sets, since part of what we want to ensure is that each map has a
set as its domain and another as its range. But after a bit of poking about it becomes
clear that BLM all by itself equips us with objects that can play this role { that is, with
objects that behave just like sets. These set-surrogates are dened as follows:
Let's suppose we have sucient functional comprehension at our disposal so that
9f8x(f(x) = x) is true. Then we can add a dened constant id to our language by
simply translating, for any context , the phrase \(id)" as \8f(8z(f(z) = z)! (f)).
We can then dene the terms \Set" and \2" in the theory T that takes (a consistent
version of) BLM as its lone axiom in the following way:
5 Notice M may be a class-function and not necessarily a set-function.
45
1. Set(x) := 9P (x = m(id; P; P ))
2. y 2 x := Set(x) ^ 8P (x = m(id; P; P )! Py)
Using these denitions, we see that the theory of mapping abstraction contains within
it a relative theory of set abstraction { we've recovered sets as the identity maps. One
should, of course, ensure everything works at this point (and go back to take care of
the pesky issue of inconsistency!). But since (a) it's relatively clear what to do in these
regards (e.g. check that for each mapping there is a set that serves as its domain,
another that serves as its range, etc.) and (b) doing these things would take us too far
aeld, we instead leave it as an exercise for the reader.
And, on that note, we conclude our propaedeutic. In the next section we get down
to the business of dening a relative abstraction theory for categories. It is worth noting
that a category, as we will understand the term here, is simply a collection of arrows with
an associative law of composition that admits left and right identities.6 Functors, in
turn, are then no more than maps between these that commute with the compositions.
Taking a page from the construction just examined, a theory of functorial abstraction
should associate objects that we will call functors to equivalence classes of one place
total functions distinguished by what their domains and codomains are taken to be and
how they treat the specied categorial structure in their domains. We expect to be
able to use a functorial abstraction principle to recover individual categories by seeing
them as identity functors. Thus, what follows will be a theory of relative categorial
abstraction analogous to the theory of relative set abstraction just gestured towards.
The major dierence to be accounted for here is that categories have a great deal more
\internal" structure than sets.
3.3 Generators and Functorial Abstraction
It is a theorem of elementary category theory that the poset category corresponding
to the ordinal 2 is a generator for the category of all small categories. Informally,
this means distinct parallel functors can always be distinguished by how they compose
6 This relies on the well-known object-free denition of a category, where the word \object" is a
dened term equivalent to the phrase \identity arrow."
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with maps from the ordinal category 2. [4], contains the following formalization of this
theorem:7
8A8B8f8g[A f //B ^ A g //B ^ 8u(2 u //A ) fu = gu)) f = g]
Those of the right disposition will be struck immediately by how close this sen-
tence is to having the syntactic form of an abstraction principle. Using the partial
outline of a theory of mapping abstraction given above as a framework, we turn this
almost-abstraction-principle into the following actual abstraction principle (it's written
on several lines here so that it's easier to analyze later):
(Line 1) 88 
"
F() = F( ),
(Line 2)

:
h
Frl _ Frl 
i
_
(Line 3)
h
Frl ^ Frl ^ Srchi = Srch i ^ Tgthi = Tgth i^
(Line 4) 9T  2T ^ 8[(Frl ^ Srchi = T ^ Tgthi = Srchi)
) Fnchi Fnchi  Fnch i Fnchi]i#
We will call this abstraction principle BLF. Of course, BLF is useless to us as it stands
since its right hand side (Lines 2-4) is mostly goofy-looking symbols without standard
denitions. The next section will be spent providing denitions that will allow us to
translate the entire right-hand side of BLF into a single sentence containing two free
variables in a fourth-order language. However, before diving into the technicalities, an
intuitive overview of BLF will help set the stage, beginning with Line 1.
Roughly, the variables  and  will range over quintuples of the form
hunary function, binary function, unary predicate, binary function,
unary predicatei
7 Lawvere's functions take their arguments from the left, so this is actually a slight syntactic
modication of the sentence from his dissertation.
47
Let us say that variables of this form have type t. Since a category is, for us, no more
than a binary function specifying how arrows from a specied family compose, we can
think of entities of type t as actually being triples of the form
hunary function, category, categoryi
The language we will dene includes logical functions Fnc, Src, and Tgt dened
so that if  is of type t, Fnchi is the unary function component of , Srchi is the
rst category in , and Tgthi is the second category in . Intuitively, Fnc stands for
\function", Src for \source", and Tgt for \target". The language will also contain a
dened predicate Frl such that if  has type t, then Frl holds if and only if the func-
tion Fnchi respects the categorial structure in the categories Srchi and Tgthi. Thus
Frl intuitively means that  behaves functorially. Last, there is a dened predicate
2 holding of those pairs of the form hbinary function, unary predicatei that intu-
itively represent a category isomorphic to the ordinal category 2 corresponding to the
ordinal 2. Now, going through the remaining lines of BLF, we see that we will associate
the same functor with two objects  and  of type t just when
(Line 2)  and  both fail to behave functorially; or
(Line 3)  and  do both behave functorially, and further have the same source and
target, and
(Line 4) There is a category T isomorphic to the ordinal category 2 so that for all
functors  with source T and whose target is the same as the source of  or  
(and can hence compose with  or  ), the composition of the functor-part of 
with the functor-part of  is equal everywhere on T to the composition of the
functor-part of  with the functor-part of .
With this intuitive picture in mind, we now turn to the technicalities.
3.4 Language and Denitions
We rst deal with syntax. The language L is an extension of the language of full third-
order logic. It has, in particular, variables for and quantiers ranging over entities of
the following types:
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 Object-type, for which we use the lowercase roman letters x; y; z.
 Predicate-type (unary suces), for which we use the uppercase roman letters
P;Q;R.
 Function-type (unary and binary), for which we use the lowercase roman letters
f; g; h.
 A type consisting of pairs hbinary function, unary predicatei, for which we
use the uppercase roman letters S and T . We will say the things these variables
range over have the type Cat
 A type consisting of quintuples
hunary function, binary function, unary predicate, binary function,
unary predicatei.
For these variables we will use lowercase greek letters ,  ,  and  . We will say
the things these variables range over have type Fun.
The reader who is concerned about the high order of this language will probably be able
to tell, in the course of the construction that follows, that it is not strictly necessary.
Most of what is done here could be carried out in a much less rich language, though it's
unclear if the result of a reduction to as lean a language as possible would be intelligible.
We also assume the following logical operators:
 Two correspondences Src and Tgt between the type-Fun things and the type-Cat
things, dened so that
Srchi = Srchf; g; P; h;Ri = hg; P i
Tgthi = Tgthf; g; P; h;Ri = hh;Ri
 A correspondence Fnc between the type-Fun things and the things of function-
type, dened so that
Fnchi = Fnchf; g; P; h;Ri = f
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 A correspondence Cmp between the type-Cat things and the things of function-
type, dened so that
CmphT i = Cmphf; P i = f
 A correspondence Dom between the type-Cat things and the things of predicate-
type, dened so that
DomhT i = Domhf; P i = P
 A composition operation  that maps pairs of functions to their composite in the
obvious way.
Finally, L contains a correspondence F from entities of Fun-type to objects.8
We now review a bit of the material in [37].
Let P be a concept variable and f a two-place function variable. Dene the open
sentences RidP;f and LidP;f by
LidP;f (a; b) :=
h
Pb ^ f(b; a) = a ^  8z f(b; z) = z _ :Pf(b; z))
^  8z f(z; b) = z _ :Pf(z; b)i
RidP;f (a; b) :=
h
Pb ^ f(a; b) = a ^  8z f(z; b) = z _ :Pf(b; y)
^  8z f(b; z) = z _ :Pf(b; z)i
Intuitively, LidP;f (a; b) (respectively, RidP;f (a; b)) says b behaves like a left (right) f -
identity for a with respect to objects falling under P . In [37], Lid and Rid are used to
help state the following axioms:
(I) (8x)(8y)

:Py ) :Pf(x; y) ^ :Pf(y; x)
(II) (8x)

Px) (9y) LidP;f (x; y)
(III) (8x)

Px) (9y) RidP;f (x; y)
(IV) (8x)(8y)

[Px ^ Py]) (9i)  RidP;f (i; x) ^ LidP;f (i; y) ! Pf(y; x)
8 Note that the inclusion of this operator is what makes L into a fourth order language.
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(V) (8x)(8y)(8z)

Pf(x; y) ^ Pf(y; z)) f(f(x; y); z) = f(x; f(y; z))
From a particular function g and concept S satisfying these axioms we recover a category
S whose arrows are all the objects falling under S. The composition in S is given by
leaving a  b undened when g(a; b) is not in S and otherwise letting a  b = g(a; b).
Conversely, given a category C, let g be any two-place total function on the universe
satisfying g(a; b) = a  b when the latter is dened, and which sends other pairs to
non-C-arrows.9 A pair consisting of the concept that holds of all and only the arrows
of C and any such g will then satisfy axioms (I)-(V).
Dene ax(f; P ) to be the conjunction of (I)-(V). Using ax, we produce a dened
L-predicate Frl that holds of variables of type Fun. Intuitively, Frl says that  is
functorial. This means, in particular, that Srchi satises ax and Tgthi satises ax,
and, in addition, that Fnchi respects the categorial structure in Srchi and Tgthi.
The following formula captures all these details:
Frl =df ax(Srchi) ^ ax(Tgthi) ^ 8z(DomhSrchiiz ! DomhTgthii Fnchi(z))^
8x8y[DomhSrchiix ^ DomhTgthiiy !
Fnchi(CmphSrchii(x; y)) = CmphTgthii(Fnchi(x); Fnchi(y))]
Suppose T is of Cat-type, and suppose 8x(: DomhT ix). We will call such a T empty for
obvious reasons. We have the following, worth noting at this time:
Fact 1: If Srchi is empty and Tgthi is empty, then Frl, no matter what
Fnchi is.
We next dene the predicate 2. 2 is a predicate holding of things of Cat-type, and
2T is meant to express that T is isomorphic to the ordinal category 2. This means that
exactly three elements of the domain (call them a, b, and c) fall under DomhT i, and with
respect to these three elements the function CmphT i satises the conditions given in the
table in Figure 3.1, where we use ? as shorthand for the sentence expressing that the
given object is not in DomhT i. Together these ensure that the category T represents
looks like the ordinal category 2, a picture of which can also be found in Figure 3.1
9 For clarity, by \non-C-arrows" I mean non-(C-arrows); that is, things that fail to be C-arrows, not
merely arrows that are not among C's. Thus, for example, if C is the category representing the ordinal
138, then among the objects qualifying as non-C-arrows are you and me and the set of all beluga whales,
etc.
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a b c
a a b ?
b ? ? b
c ? ? c
a
 b //
c

Figure 3.1: Multiplication Table for and Picture of 2
The last thing to dene is the predicate  that occurs written with inx notation
at the end of BLF.  is a four-place predicate that intuitively holds when (a) the
composition of its rst pair of inputs is functorial, (b) the composition of its second pair
of inputs is functorial, and (c), the two compositions are in fact equal over the entire
domain of the relevant categories. Formally, this is given by
 hFnchi; Fnchi; Fnch i; Fnchii =df FrlhFnchi  Fnchi; Srchi; Tgthii^
FrlhFnch i  Fnchi; Srchi; Tgth ii^
8x[DomhSrchiix!
Fnchi  Fnchi(x) = Fnch i  Fnchi(x)]
Using these denitions, one can methodically unfold the right hand side of BLF and
reduce it to a sentence in L containing only  and  free. For convenience, we restate
BLF here without weird linebreaks:
88 
"
F() = F( ),

:
h
Frl _ Frl 
i
_
h
Frl ^ Frl ^ Srchi = Srch i ^
Tgthi = Tgth i ^ 9T  2T ^ 8[(Frl ^ Srchi = T ^
Tgthi = Srchi)) Fnchi Fnchi  Fnch i Fnchi]i#
In the next section, we examine consistency issues. It should be clear that BLF is
both inconsistent and unsatisable, so we don't prove this { the interested reader can
construct the proofs with little eort in any event.
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3.5 Consistency and Size Issues
Recall that if P is a subconcept of Q, jfx : Pxgj =  and jfx : Qxgj = , then P is
called exponentially small relative to Q when   . If the universe has cardinality
c, then we say P is exponentially small relative to the universe when c  c. A two-
place \relative exponential smallness predicate" is expressible in third-order logic, see
[30] for details. In the remainder, we let Esm be a dened predicate (expressible in our
third-order language) that holds of exactly those concepts that are exponentially small
relative to the universe. Further, we also dene a 2-place predicate Rsm, that holds of a
pair of concepts P and Q just when Q is exponentially small relative to P .
Let BLFE name the abstraction principle formed by restricting BLF to those quin-
tuples hf; P; g;Q; hi for which P and Q are both exponentially small relative to the
universe. Being somewhat more explicit, the righthand side of BLFE will begin
   ,

:
h
Frl _ Frl 
i
_ :
h
EsmhDomhSrchiii _ EsmhDomhTgthiii
i
_
h
Frl ^ Frl ^ EsmhDomhSrchiii ^ EsmhDomhTgthiii ^ : : :
BLFE is in fact consistent. This can be checked in a straightforwardly combinatorial
way (see Appendix for details). Despite this, BLFE is somewhat uninteresting on its
own because too many objects lie in the range of its abstraction operator. That is,
the concept holding of exactly the objects in the range of BLFE is not exponentially
small relative to the universe. Recall that our general plan had been to (a) produce an
abstraction principle whose abstracts correspond to functors (which we've now done),
then (b) to realize individual categories as the identity functors, and nally (c) discern
the internal structure of the categories themselves by examining how they behave in the
category of all such categories. This latter aim is frustrated by the fact that the collection
of all functors { the natural object from which to build our category of categories { is
too big for BLFE to act on. So in some sense, BLFE cannot provide us with an object
corresponding to a category of all categories.
To rectify this we proceed as follows: suppose U is a concept that is exponentially
small relative to the universe. We will add to L a predicate U holding of all and only
those objects falling under U . We then restrict BLF to those quintuples hf; P; g;Q; hi
for which P and Q are both exponentially small relative to U . If we call this new
53
abstraction principle BLFU , its righthand side will begin
   ,

:
h
Frl _ Frl 
i
_ :
h
RsmhU; DomhSrchiii _ RsmhU; DomhTgthiii
i
_
h
Frl ^ Frl ^ RsmhU; DomhSrchiii ^ RsmhU; DomhTgthiii ^ : : :
The thing to take note of regarding BLFU is the following: if we let FU be the abstraction
operator in BLFU , then the concept cU named by the predicate 9(x = BLFU ()) is itself
exponentially small (not relative to U but) relative to the universe.
Let the abstraction operator in BLFE be called FE . Then the concept that holds
of the objects in the range of BLFU is small enough for FE to act non-trivially on. In
particular, if CU = FE(id; cU; f; cU; f) where f is an arbitrary function representing the
composition of the objects in the range of FU (more on this below), then CU is the
identity functor (category) at (of) all the U -small categories and functors. In this way,
functorial abstraction gives us, for each exponentially small concept U , a category of
all U -small categories. That is, functorial abstraction is a relative theory of categorial
abstraction that includes a relative theory of category-of-category abstraction.
In the next section, a number of technical constructions demonstrating the features
of CU are given. The results are summarized at the start of section 7, so the reader
uninterested in seeing these details can skip there.
3.6 Features of the Category of U-small Categories
Let U be an exponentially small concept that contains a nonempty subconcept expo-
nentially small relative to it. The theory we will be examining will take as axioms both
BLFU and BLFE .
As just demonstrated, BLFE admits an identity functor CU that we identify with
the category of all U -small categories. To justify seeing CU as a category of categories,
we need to determine that CU behaves as a category of categories ought. In particular,
notice that just as it was with BLM, BLFU does not supply us with highly structured
objects { the objects in the range of FU are not in an obvious way required by a theory
that takes BLFU as its only axiom to have any properties other than that they correspond
to certain equivalence classes of functions. A category of categories on the other hand
should have inside of it genuine categories with honest-to-god functors connecting them.
54
In the remainder of this section we demonstrate that the identity arrows in CU
interact with the other arrows in CU in a way that allows us to see each identity functor
as a category in its own right. To complete this task, I should also show the non-identity
arrows \behave functorially" with respect to this derived internal categorial structure.
However, this demonstration would essentially be a repetition of details that can be
found in [32], so is not reproduced here.
A nal introductory note to this section: to every abstract of BLFU there is a cor-
responding abstract of BLFE . There is thus a strict sense in which BLFU is superuous.
Nonetheless, it would be dicult to actually do any of the constructions that follow
relying only on BLFE . Those with logicist leanings, however, should rest assured that
the \BLFU -ladder" is (at least in principle) something we can kick away at the end.
3.6.1 Preliminaries
The idea is the following: In the case of BLM we were able to use the structure imparted by
BLM to recover the \internal" structure of the sets we represented by identity mappings.
Similarly, given a U -category C { that is, an identity arrow in the range of BLFU { we
can use the functors in the category CU to discern the internal structure of C. Since
most of the \action" is in the second disjunct of the right hand side of the principles
BLFU and BLFE we restrict our attention to these portions. In order to not have to
repeat myself too much, when I make claims that hold for both FU and FE , I will use
F and BLF, unsubscripted, and leave it to the reader to supply the two versions of the
statement that result from applying subscripts in the appropriate places.
The rst thing to notice is that there is an obvious way to compose objects in the
range of the F-operator. Explicitly,
Definition 1:
F()  F( ) =df F(Fnchi  Fnch i; Srch i; Tgthi):
It is trivial to verify this is well-dened and associative.
Also, recall that objects of Fun-type which fail to satisfy Frl are all mapped by the
correspondence F to the same object. We call this object \the bad object", and we
have
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Definition 2:
/ is the bad object.
There is no reason to suppose that the object / that plays the \bad object" role for
BLFE is the same as the one that plays this role for BLFU . Nonetheless we use the name
/ to refer to either of them, and allow context to distinguish which one we are referring
to.
Returning to composition, using /, we can now state
Fact 2:
Identities behave correctly: if x = F(id; P; f; P; f), then for any y, if xy 6=
/ then x  y = y, and if y  x 6= / then y  x = y (this is clear from the
denitions).
Next, suppose 2S and  = hf; S; T i, where T is of Cat-type. It is customary to call
such a  a 2-element of T . It is immediate from BLF that parallel functors are either
equal or disagree on being evaluated at (that is to say, composed with) some 2-element.
Speaking in the usual informal language of category theory:
Fact 3:
2 is a generator.10
Now for some terminology: It will be important to distinguish between the abstracts
in the range of BLFE , which we will call functors and for which we will use bold font
characters (e.g. A, B,. . . , 1, 2,. . . , etc.), and the abstracts in the range of BLFU , which
we will call arrows and for which we will use non-bolded upper-case characters.
Observe that if S is of Cat-type and is empty, then there is no T and no  so that
Frl ^ Srchi = T ^ Tgthi = S. It thus follows from BLF directly that all quintuples
hf; S; Si were S is empty will be identied by either version of BLF. But by Fact 1, this
object is not /. We thus have
Definition 3:
If S is of Cat-type and empty, then 0 =df FE(id; S; S) and 0 =df FU (id; S; S).
10 Notice that this was essentially the starting point for the theory, so recovering it as a consequence
is not unexpected.
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It follows from Denition 3 that for each identity functor B = FE(id; T; T ), there
is exactly one functor !B that simultaneously satises both B  !B 6= / and !B  0 6= /.
That is,
Fact 4:
0 is initial among the functors and 0 is initial among the arrows.
Next, suppose f is a particular but arbitrary two-place total function for which there
is exactly one element of the universe satisfying f(x; x) = x. Call this element  and
suppose  falls under U . Also suppose for any x 6=  the f -multiplication table for 
and x looks like Table 3.1 (repeating abbreviations from before).
 x
  ?
x ? ?
Table 3.1: Multiplication Table for 1
Let T be the pair consisting of the function f and the concept holding only of .
Definition 4:
1 = FE(id; T; T ) and 1 = FU (id; T; T ).
By an argument similar to the one above we can see
Fact 5:
1 and 1 are terminal among the functors and among the arrows, respectively.
In a similar way, by writing out multiplication tables and encoding these in our logic,
we can produce identity functors for the ordinals 2, 2, and 3, which we will need in the
remainder.
Now, given x = FE(f; S; T ), notice that the functors A = FE(id; S; T ) and B =
FE(id; T; T ) are well dened, and these are the unique functors that behave as left and
right composition-identities for x. For this reason, we write x : A  ! B. A similar set
of denitions can obviously be stated for FU .
Using all of this, we now have
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Definition 5:
By \an object of CU," we mean either (a) An identity arrow in the range
of BLFU or (b) A functor f : 1  ! CU in the range of BLFE . These are
in natural bijection, so we do not distinguish between them. We call the
objects of CU U -categories to distinguish them from the objects (identity
functors) in the range of BLFE , which we will call E-categories.
The bijection between identity arrows and functors 1  ! CU can be extended to a
bijection between arrows in general and functors 2  ! CU. So we have
Definition 6:
By \an arrow of CU" we will mean either (a) An abstract in the range of
BLFU or (b) A functor f : 2) CU in the range of BLFE .
It is a consequence of the denitions of 1 and 2 that there are exactly two functors
1  ! 2. If f is an arrow of CU, then, we can compose f with these two functors to get
a unique pair of objects sf and tf which we distinguish (when they are dierent) by
demanding that f  sf be dened and that tf  f be dened. We call sf the source of f
and tf the target of f and say that f goes from sf to tf .
11
Definitions 6-9:
Given C is an object of CU (that is, a U -category), we dene a C-object to
be an arrow from 1 to C and a C-morphism to be an arrow from 2 to C. A
constant arrow is an arrow whose range is a single object; that is, an arrow
that factors through an object. A discrete U -category is a U -category C for
which every arrow 2 //C is constant. Repeating much of the previous
paragraph, we can dene source and target, to and from for morphisms of a
given U -category.
3.6.2 Theorems
The following theorems are easily proved:
11 This method of distinguishing source from target depends on the conation of the two denitions
of objects. This is not the only way to accomplish this, but is the most intuitive, to my reckoning.
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 Given morphisms a and b in the U -category C, there is a discrete E-category
fa; bg whose objects are exactly a and b. There is also a discrete U -category E-
isomorphic to fa; bg. For convenience, we identify these two isomorphic categories,
so fa; bg will be considered a U -category.
 There are two non-constant epic arrows 2 //fa; bg .12 We identify these with
the pairs (a; b) and (b; a).
Using pairs we can easily dene products of U -categories, in the usual way.
Similarly, we can easily build disjoint union categories: if S and T are of type Cat,
we can assume without loss of generality that DomhSi and DomhT i are disjoint (since they
are small relative to U). The disjoint union of S and T is then FU (id; S
`
T; S
`
T )
where S
`
T is the pair consisting of the concept that holds of the disjoint union of
DomhSi and DomhT i, and the two-place function that satises CmphSi when both its
arguments lie inside S, and which satises CmphT i everywhere else. This paragraph and
the previous allow us to conclude that the category of U -categories has nite products
and nite coproducts.
One can easily show the equalizer of any pair of parallel arrows exists: Suppose 
and 	 are of Fun type, and suppose Srchi = Srch	i, and Tgthi = Tgth	i. Let
F = FU () 6= / and G = FU (	) 6= /. Finally, let A = FU (id; Srchi; Srchi)
and B = FU (id; Tgth	i; Tgth	i). It is standard to write this A
G
//
F //B . Then the
equalizer of F and G is FU (id; FEG;FEG), where FEG is the pair consisting of the
concept holding of those elements of Srchi where Fnchi = Fnch	i and the function
CmphTgthii.
Coequalizers take work but can also be shown to exist. Rather then provide all the
necessary details here, I refer the reader to the excellent presentation in [38]. It is clear
that a similar class of constructions to these can be carried out.
As in Lawvere's thesis, given arrows F;G : C  ! D, we identify natural transfor-
mations  : F  ! G with arrows C  2  ! D. We can thus dene exponential objects:
given two U -categories C and D, let DC = F(id; dc; dc) where dc is a pair consisting
of the concept Pdc holding of those arrows  for which there are arrows F;G : C  ! D
12 Recall that an arrow a is epic if it is right-cancelable, that is, if whenever b  a = c  a we can
conclude that b = c.
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that make the following diagram commute, and we explain the  notation below:
C  f0g
F
##G
GG
GG
GG
GG

C  2  // D
C  f1g
OO
G
;;wwwwwwwww
and a function that maps a pair of such arrows to the arrow    that makes the
following diagram commute when such exists, and maps to objects not falling under Pdc
otherwise:13
C  3


D
C  f0g //
F
44jjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjj
C  2

::uuuuuuuuuuuu
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C  f1g //oo
G
OO
C  20

ddJJJJJJJJJJJJ
ff
C  f2goo
H
jjTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTT
A lengthy but routine verication then establishes that this object is indeed an
exponential object for C and D. However, at this point we may leave the E-category
CU { exponential objects need not be U-categories, as they may simply be too big.
However, they will certainly be E-categories. Thus, F is meant to pick out whichever
of the F 's is needed here.
3.7 Philosophical Conclusion
Altogether, the category of U -small categories can now be seen to be nitely complete
and cocomplete, and exponential objects { despite potentially being too large { are
available, though not all of them are properly part of the category of U -small categories.
These features demonstrate abstractionist categories of categories have some intrinsic
interest. This construction has raised more questions than it has answered, though.
The three that most interest me are the following:
13 In this diagram, 20 is actually just 2, but where we now identify it as 1 // 2 instead of
0 // 1 . This makes sense of the two arrows C  2 // C  3 .
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(1) Can we prove the existence of nontrivial topoi?
(2) How do we produce enriched categories or (more specically), 2-categories?
(3) The identity conditions we've imposed on functors are a bit severe. Can they be
relaxed?
Expanding on (3) a bit, the question to examine is whether we can recover essentially
the same theory using a \nicer" version of Frl.
A great deal of development remains to be done before we can answer these. A
broader project worth pursuing is to philosophically and technically examine a general
theory of relative abstraction along the lines hinted at in this paper.
As promised, however, at this point we put aside technicalities and examine the
philosophical signicance of the above derivation of the internal structure of particular
U -categories in terms of the \external" structure of the E-category of all U -categories.
As pointed out before, the fact that categories have a rich internal structure has been
grounds for rejecting categories of categories for foundational purposes in the past.
The above demonstration that all the internal structure of a (small) category can be
recovered as a matter of logic from only features of the (large) category of all (small)
categories should put pressure on this view, since it suggests a blurring of the internal
structure/external structure distinction on which the objection relies.14
Nonetheless, a persistent objector could continue arguing as follows: The above con-
struction only satised me on the condition that it provided an account of the internal
structure of particular U -categories in terms of the structure of the E-category of all
U -categories. Thus, in order to understand the foundational signicance of the construc-
tion provided (and thus the foundational signicance of category theory in general), a
prior knowledge of this internal structure is necessary. So categories of categories are
not properly autonomous, hence cannot serve as an autonomous foundation for mathe-
matics.
I have two responses to this.
14 I am by no means claiming to be original here. Both this result and this interpretation of it
are common in the category-theory literature and \folklore". I should further point out that the heavy
reliance of this approach on higher-order logic and full second-order comprehension mean that this
result in no way puts pressure on issues regarding the autonomy of a rst-order theory of a category of
categories.
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 In the rst place, the fact that I was looking for an external characterization of
the internal structure of a category does not demonstrate the characterization I
found depends on knowledge of both structures in order to be coherent.
 In the second place, all one needs is a category-theory independent way of under-
standing the notion of a category (such as that given in [39]) in order to recognize
that a particular category one has been presented with can be seen in such a way
that its identity morphisms intuitively behave like categories themselves. This is
exactly what the above construction allows.
Thus, at least this objection to a category of categories as an autonomous mathematical
object, and hence as acceptable foundational purposes seems inadmissible. This in no
way obviates, e.g. the objections to the autonomy of a rst-order category theory found
in [11]. In particular, Hellman points out that in a category of categories \somehow
we need to make sense of talk of structures satisfying the axioms of category theory,
i.e, being categories." This seems correct. In fact, far from obviating such points, the
approach on hand is an explicit instance of them: the rst and second conjuncts of
the predicate Frl demand that Tgthi and Srchi satisfy ax { that is, that they be
categories. That we can make this demand at all depends, in turn, on our use of higher-
order logic in the statement of this abstraction principle. Thus, we should perhaps add
the following caveat: a category of categories is as acceptable for foundational purposes
as anything else that relies on higher-order logics. For the abstractionist, presumably,
this isn't giving up much.
Aside from what this construction says about foundational matters { interesting
though this may be { there is further philosophical merit to the construction provided.
As remarked above, one need not be an neologicist to nd the production of abstraction
principles valuable. When the identity conditions laid down by an abstraction principle
suce to determine all the features some given type of object is supposed to have, one
has reason to believe that those identity conditions specify something like the essential
features of the objects in question. We've now seen that BLFU does exactly this for the
category of U -small categories. Putting aside all neologicist claims about abstraction
principles, this result retains signicant epistemic signicance: it gives us reason to
believe that the identity conditions BLFU captures tell us something essential about
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categories.
The remarkable thing about this is the essential simplicity of what BLFU imposes.
Underneath the technicalities, what it \says" is the dening feature of a category of
categories is that 2 is a generator. That using \2 is a generator" as an abstraction
principle is, in turn, capable of producing (together with higher-order logic) so much
category theory suggests that 2 being a generator is not only essential to what it means
to be a category of categories, but also to category theory writ large.15
Such justication for the theory produced here is clearly needed. After all, a second-
order Hilbert-style axiomatization of categories of categories would seem to be a much
easier approach to providing dening conditions on categories of categories than the
route taken here.16 When one examines such an axiomatization { for example, one
could take a version of either the theory given in [2] or the one in [32] { the central role
being played by \2 is a generator" is entirely obscured. One can see the same thing at
play when comparing the theory of arithmetic provided by HP with, say, second-order
Peano Arithmetic. The latter obscures any relevant role being played by \concepts in
bijection get the same number". It is a substantial epistemic insight into the nature of
arithmetic as a mathematical and scientic practice to establish { as Frege and Boolos'
15 These facts are suggestive of an analogy worth looking into more { any one-element set, after
all, is a generator for a category of sets in precisely the same way that 2 is a generator for a category
of categories. Perhaps a relative set abstraction theory based on \1 is a generator" would have some
intrinsic interest. More speculatively, it might be worth seeing what the the relative abstraction theory
based on \ is a generator" might lead us to for arbitrary ordinals .
16 It is worth pausing here to point out that there is an important sense in which the Hilbertian-
structuralist approach to the foundations of mathematics and the neologicist approach can be seen as
answering dierent questions. These dierences are more easily seen in the case of arithmetic. The
Hilbertian-structuralist would propose { a la Dedekind's famous treatment in [40] { their axioms as
solutions to the question \How must things be in order that they behave as numbers?" or, using the
standard jargon, \How can we dene what it is to be a natural numbers structure?". The neologicist
reconstruction of arithmetic, on the other hand answers the question \What are the essential features
of numbers?" and answers it by providing identity conditions in terms of these essential features. As it
turns out, isolating these essential feature still leaves open the actual identity of the objects in question
{ this is the problem known in the literature as the Caesar Problem (see, e.g. [41], [19], [42], [43], or
[44]).
The fact that the questions being asked by the devotees of the two approaches are dierent precedes
and in some sense explains the epistemic dierence being discussed here. We should be unsurprised,
that is, to not nd in an axiomatization of a category of categories like Lawvere's, anything that tells
us which features of categories of categories describe their \essential role" in our mathematical and
scientic practices. Lawvere's axioms were simply not aimed at providing this sort of information, but
rather at describing how things must be in order that they behave as categories { no matter what those
things might actually be.
63
theorems do { that in fact \concepts in bijection get the same number" provides us
with the whole of arithmetic. Similarly, it is a substantial epistemic insight into the
nature of category theory as a scientic and mathematical practice to observe that \2
is a generator" gets us at least a substantial and important fragment of that discipline.
Appendix: Proof that BLFE Can be Modeled
The following is a sketch of a proof that BLFE can be modeled. We begin by counting,
for a set S of cardinality c and an arbitrary cardinal @0    c, the cardinality of
f(A;B; f; g; h) : A  S;B  S; jAj  ; jBj  ; f : AA) S; g : BB ) S; h : A) Bg
We proceed in stages.
Stage 1: Observe there are c choices for A and for B. Thus, there are (c)2 pairs
(A;B).
Stage 2: Next, notice that for a given A, there are no more than c
2
options for f .
Thus, there are no more than than c
2  (c)2 triples (A;B; f).
Stage 3: Similarly, for a given B, there are no more than c
2
options for g. Thus, there
are no more than than (c
2
)2  (c)2 quadruples (A;B; f; g).
Stage 4: Finally, for a given A and B, there are no more than  options for h. Thus,
there are no more than than   (c2)2  (c)2 quintuples (A;B; f; g; h).
In any model of BLFE in a domain of cardinality c, the abstracts it produces correspond
to equivalence classes formed from a subset of the quintuples with this form, so the
cardinal number just computed is an upper bound on the cardinality of the collection
of abstracts in the range of BLFE .
Finally, supposing @0    c and c  c, it is clear that this upper bound is no
more than c. Thus, BLFE produces no more than c abstracts, so it can be modeled.
Chapter 4
The Semantics of Social
Constructivism
In a 2010 paper, Jill Dieterle criticized the view in Cole's 2009 paper for being unable
to account for the atemporality of mathematical existents. Cole's 2013 paper addresses
this objection, providing a modication of his 2009 paper allowing for atemporal math-
ematicalia. An unusual consequence of Cole's account is that at least some existential
claims about mathematicalia used to be false but now have always been true.
By examining the semantics of such claims, we demonstrate that social construc-
tivism is in fact, despite Cole's attempts to rectify matters, incompatible with atemporal
mathematicalia. In the course of examining these semantic details, however, an alter-
native hybrid view of ctionalism and social constructivism emerges. Those tempted
by social constructivism, while perhaps disappointed by the negative results of the pa-
per, may be encouraged by how much of their view can be recovered in this alternative
account.
4.1 The Cole-Dieterle Debate
Consider the following well-known puzzle:
\The freedom and authority that mathematicians feel they enjoy to cre-
atively postulate mathematical entities do not accord well with realist or
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Platonist interpretations of mathematical theories. Yet, the intellectual ease
with which mathematicians ontologically commit themselves to mathemati-
cal entities does not accord well with ctionalist or modal nominalist inter-
pretations of mathematical theories." [5, p. 593]
It is worth explaining a few details of Cole's presentation of this problem, as it underlies
much of the appeal social constructivist claims have in general.
Cole understands mathematical platonism to directly challenge the authority math-
ematical practice suggests the mathematician has to postulate new mathematical enti-
ties. Roughly, as Cole puts it, if mathematical entities exist but are conned to other
`realms,' then \mathematicians' authority { particularly to postulate new mathematical
entities { is legitimate only if [the mathematicians] are epistemologically in tune with
these realms." That is, in the world as it appears to the platonist, mathematicians do
not have the authority to introduce new entities and endorse new existential claims at
will. Instead, a mathematician is authorized to make only those claims that agree with
the facts about which mathematical entities actually populate the `other realms.' So,
unless she is in sucient contact with these realms to have a (at least partial) roster
of their constituents, the mathematician is without authority to \endorse existential
pure mathematical statements" with the levels of freedom and authority mathematical
phenomenology would lead her to expect.
Fictionalism and modal nominalism face a dierent type of problem. For these
sorts of theories, it is no problem to postulate new mathematical entities, but this
freedom comes at the cost of changing how such claims are to be interpreted. Of
particular importance for this essay is that ctionalism is characterized by understanding
mathematical existence claims to be literally false. Such an interpretation, however, does
not appear consistent with the way these claims are made by practicing mathematicians.
Social constructivism can be seen as an alternative to these traditional accounts.
Mathematicalia, on this account, are \pure constitutive social constructs" that are \con-
stituted by mathematical activities." Cole denes these phrases as follows:
 \[A]n item is a constitutive social construct if and only if it exists in virtue of
a group of individuals having granted [it] a normative role in certain of their
activities."[5, p. 597]
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 Pure constitutive social constructs are those social constructs which are not pre-
existing objects now being assigned a new function, but those whose very presence
relies on social construction.
Cole thus supposes, in particular, that mathematicalia are objects whose existence both
depends on and supervenes on mathematicians' doing mathematics.
[6] presents criticisms specically aimed at Cole's 2009 account, but which apply
more generally to any attempt to provide a social-constructive metaphysical account of
mathematics. Of the criticisms presented there, the one that will occupy us she calls
\The Contingency Thesis:"
\if one claims that X is socially constructed, then one must believe that X
is not inevitable. If X is the product of social forces, then X exists, or exists
in the way that it does, only contingently. At least on rst inspection, this
seems exactly wrong in the case of mathematics."[6, p. 323]
In particular, social constructs seem highly temporally contingent. For example, it seems
social constructivists (and Cole in particular) must deny mathematicalia existed prior to
the presence of a group of individuals granting mathematicalia a role in certain of their
activities. But if this is true, it seems quantifying over mathematicalia in descriptions of
the very distant past may be illegitimate since the entities being quantied over literally
did not exist at such times. This puts much of our very best science (e.g. cosmology,
evolutionary biology, etc.) at risk of incoherence in the following way:
Suppose we ask \why is the Sun not a blue dwarf?" Presumably, our best answer
would be something like \when the Sun was forming, the cloud it accreted from had
a density between x and y and a mass of available material between w and z. This
caused the development to proceed in such and such a way." This answer appears to
contain terms meant to refer to numbers with respect to a time when, if numbers are
social constructs, there would be no referent for such terms. At least prima facie, such
claims seem at risk of being rendered incoherent by any account of the metaphysics of
mathematicalia (like Cole's) which holds
(i) Mathematical claims must be literally true in order to have their intended meaning,
and
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(ii) Truths about mathematical existence claims supervene on mathematical practices.
In his 2013 paper, Cole responds to Dieterle's criticism by claiming social construc-
tion has powers not only of ontological creativity, but also of modal creativity. That is,
Cole claims that not only can social action lead to the production of new things, it can
also lead to new necessities. This modal creativity is introduced via what Cole names
temporal and modal proles:
\Label the collection of times at which some facet of reality exists or its atem-
porality that facet's temporal prole and the collection of possible worlds in
which it exists or its amodality its modal prole." [7, p. 20]
Cole's claim is that we can \Declare and collectively recognize that institutional facets
of reality have whatever modal prole best serves our purposes." (ibid.) So, when social
activity results in the existence of a new item (e.g. the number two), the responsible
community might, in the creative process \Declare and collectively recognize" that it
not only now exists, but also existed at other times and in other worlds (e.g. for two, it
is declared to have existed in all worlds at all times).
Now, Cole takes the trouble in his 2013 paper to provide us with a specic con-
struction (socially constructed temporal and modal proles) that allows his account to
avoid Dieterle's criticism. However, any account of the metaphysics of mathematicalia
holding (i) and (ii) above will be subject to Dieterle's criticism and will have to, in
some way, explain how existential claims concerning mathematicalia can be atemporal
truths despite mathematicalia themselves depending on mathematical practices. So,
while the criticism that follows poses a problem for any social-constructivist solution to
the problems posed by Dieterle, the emphasis will be on the details of Cole's particular
construction.
4.2 Regimenting Cole's Discussion
It is useful to begin by analyzing the linguistic structure of Cole's proposal. When doing
mathematics, it seems we use a language in which all claims of the form \at time t, there
was a prime less than three" are truths. We will call this language the object-language
(abbreviated OL) to distinguish it from the meta-language ML in which Cole theorizes
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about claims within OL and, in particular, about this type of temporal claim. My
worry centers on the semantics of ML, and, in particular, about the content of certain
temporal claims within ML that are central to the success of Cole's account.
First, an observation: a large amount of mathematics will have to be expressible
in ML. For example, Cole's discussion of temporal and modal proles is presumably
happening inML; given minimal assumptions about what our temporal discourse com-
mits us to, ML will thus have to have at least enough expressive power to formulate
claims about sets of rational numbers. From here, of course, an enormous volume of
mathematics becomes encodable within ML.
If Cole is to be taken as doing more than painting a veneer of social-constructivism
on top of a non-social-constructive core theory, though, he must be read as claiming
the referents of all mathematical language { whether occurring in OL or in ML {
are social constructs. That is, the referents of ML-mathematical language must be
\pure constitutive social constructs" just as he claims the referents of OL-mathematical
language are, else his solution to the problem of the temporality of his mathematicalia
implicitly assumes atemporal mathematicalia already exist. In particular, the claim
(made in ML) that we can \Declare and collectively recognize that institutional facets
of reality have whatever modal prole best serves our purposes" must apply to the
referents of ML-mathematical language.
The next observation to make is that a declaration or collective recognition of the
temporal prole of a given institutional facet of reality must happen at some particular
time. Prior to that time, then, that facet of reality was without the specied temporal
prole. Further, we do as a matter of fact know there were times prior to the declaration
or collective recognition of any given temporal prole. Thus ML must contain true
sentences of the form \this facet of reality has such and such temporal prole, but it
has not always had that temporal prole." Choosing an instance, if mathematicalia are
social constructs, then it is currently the case the following ML-sentence expresses a
truth:
\It has always been the case that there is a prime less than
three, but it has not always been the case that it has always
been the case that there is a prime less than three."
(3)
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4.3 The Analysis of Temporal Sentences
It is reasonable to wonder whether sentence (1) is consistent and (if it is) whether it can
be made sense of. In this section I examine two languages { LP (the language of Priorean
Temporal Logic) and an expressive expansion LPSU of LP { that share a common setting
for their semantics. The goal of the examination is to try to make sense of sentences
like (1) in a way consistent with the role they play in Cole's account. We will see that
neither language suces for this. In LP , sentences with the same logical form as (1) are
always false, while in LPSU , such sentences can be interpreted in a satisable way only if
we do not take them literally. Given these failures, we then turn to the more complex
language of Priorean Doubly-Temporal Logic, L2P .
By the end of section 5, we will see L2P is also insucient to allow for mathemati-
calia that are both atemporal and socially constructed. The appendix sketches how to
generalize this result for the languages LP for arbitrary ordinal , seeming to provide
a substantial roadblock to social constructivism (or Julian Cole's version of it, at least).
Despite these negative results, L2P does allow for a version of social constructivism that,
while not allowing for genuinely atemporal mathematicalia, nonetheless can make sense
of the fact that mathematicalia appear atemporal.
4.3.1 Syntax
Despite the ontological thrust of Cole's account, examining existential claims as propo-
sitions is sucient to expose its problems. The simplication achieved by using propo-
sitional rather than predicate temporal logic makes the few diculties this raises worth
suering.
With that in mind, let L be a standard language for propositional logic. The alpha-
bet of LP diers from the alphabet of L only by the addition of two one-place sentential
operators G and H. When translating LP -formulas into natural language (NL), G is
read \ is always going to be true;" H as \ always has been true." Grammatically,
LP is the closure of L after the addition of these operators.
In the remainder of this essay, we frequently refer back to sentence (1). To make this
easier, in every language introduced, we let Q be the proposition corresponding to the
sentence \there is a prime less than 3." Thus, in LP , (1) is most naturally translated
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M; t  P i vt(P ) = T
M; t  : i M; t 6  
M; t   ^  i M; t   and M; t   
M; t  G i M; s   for all t < s
M; t  H i M; s   for all s < t
Figure 4.1: LP Semantics
as HQ ^ :HHQ.
Notice if we read the conditional via the denition a  b := :(a ^ :b), then our
translation of (1) is logically equivalent to :(HQ  HHQ). This conditional formu-
lation of (1) is worth spending a moment examining. Recall that S4 modal logic is
characterized axiomatically by the inclusion of \2  22" among the axioms and
semantically by the demand that the accessibility relation be transitive. Regarding
temporal logic as a branch of modal logic, we see that we are going to face a rather dif-
cult task: HQ  HHQ is a sentence we anticipate will be entailed by the transitivity
of the ordering of time and, absent extremely compelling evidence, the assumption that
times are ordered transitively is something we are unlikely to give up. The remainder
of the section will make more explicit the full extent of this diculty.
4.3.2 Semantics
An LP -model is a triple hT ; <; vi, where
 hT ; <i is a poset (partially ordered set { i.e. < is an irreexive and transitive
relation on T ) representing the \times" or \moments" together with their ordering
and
 v is a function from T to the set of functions from Prop (the set of propositions)
to the two-element set fT; Fg.
For t 2 T v(t) is written vt. Thus at t 2 T , the truth value of proposition P under
valuation v is written vt(P ). In symbols we have
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v : T  ! ff : Prop  ! fT; Fgg
t 7 ! (Prop 3 P 7 ! vt(P ) 2 fT; Fg)
Given an LP -model M = hT ; <; vi and t 2 T , we dene truth in M at t in the
expected way (see Figure 4.1). Truth in a model generally, validity in a given poset,
validity in a class of posets, and validity in general are also dened as expected.
4.3.3 An Example
Let  be any LP -sentence whatsoever. Consider the LP -sentence H  HH :=
:(H ^ :HH).
We can determine the class of posets in which this sentence is valid as follows: Let
M = hT ; <; vi be an LP -model. :(H ^ :HH) is valid in M if and only if for every
t 2 T we have thatM; t  :(H^:HH). Using the semantic rules given in Figure 4.1,
we see
M; t  :(H ^ :HH) i M; t 6 H ^ :HH
i M; t 6 H or M; t 6 :HH
i M; t  HH or for some s < t M; s 6 
Next, notice M; t  HH i for all s < t, M; s  H, which in turn is true i for
all u < s, M; u  . In sum, M; t  :(H ^ :HH) i either
(a) For some s < t, M; s 6 , or
(b) For all u and all s with u < s < t, M; u  .
But if (a) is false then for every time s < t, M; s  . In particular, this makes (b)
true. We conclude that for every LP -sentence , the sentence :(H ^ :HH) is valid
in every LP -model.
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4.3.4 LP as a Solution
LP together with the semantic theory in Figure 4.1 is not an appropriate setting for
interpreting NL-sentences like (1) { at least, not if we think (as Cole seems to) that
such sentences at least might be true. To see this, observe that by the example just
examined, :(HQ ^ :HHQ) is true in every LP -model. On the other hand, (1) is most
naturally translated as HQ ^ :HHQ. So (1), when translated into LP in the most
natural way, is unsatisable.
One could argue this is exactly the expected result. After all, (1) seemed to border
on incoherence; the analysis demonstrating unsatisability only means the incoherence
is more-than-bordered-on. There seems to be some intuitive content in (1), however,
and a charitable interpretation of Cole should try a bit harder to squeeze this content
out before simply abandoning his project. In particular, it is worth spending a moment
seeing if we can suss some meaning out of (1) without abandoning LP models as the
setting for our semantic theory.
4.3.5 \Since..." and \Until..."
To solve the problem we are facing, it seems we will need to change one or more of the
following:
(a) How we interpret NL-sentences like (1),
(b) The target language of our interpretation, or
(c) The semantic theory attached to the target language of the interpretation.
The plan in this section is to focus our attention on (a). Loosely, the NL-sentence
\there has always been a prime less than 3" will be interpreted not as \HQ," but as (a
formal version of) \since (such and such), Q." To accommodate this, we have to change
both (a) and (b), but will not need to modify (c) at all. Since this type of solution
depends on interpreting NL-sentences containing the word \always" as shorthand for
longer sentences that reveal hidden conditions of the form \since (such and such)" on
which the original sentence was supposed to rely, we call it a \hidden variables" solution.
As we will see, the problem with a hidden variables solution is not satisability but
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M; t  S(;  ) i there is an s < t so that M; s   and M; u   for all s < u < t:
M; t  U(;  ) i there is an t < s so that M; s   and M; u   for all t < u < s:
Figure 4.2: LPSU Semantics
delity. That is, even if LPSU is a viable solution (which we will cast into doubt without
ruling out completely), it demands we read claims like (1) as declaring something other
than the genuine atemporality of mathematicalia.
LPSU
A hidden variables solution is well-motivated by observing that for many NL-sentences
, the claim \it has always been the case that " is more naturally interpreted using
a \since..." clause than by taking the \always" literally. For example, the sentence \I
have always loved baseball" is not well translated as \H(I love baseball)." Rather, \I
have always loved baseball" is more plausibly rendered \since I can remember, I have
loved baseball." This motivates interpreting some sentences containing the NL-temporal
quantier \always" as shorthand for claims with hidden \since..." or \until..." clauses.
To accommodate \since..." and \until..." sentences in the formal theory we must
extend LP . We do this by adding operators S and U (for since and until) to the
alphabet of LP . Examining their NL-counterparts, we see the S and U operators will
be of an unusual sort { they take not one but two sentences as arguments. Because of
this, the grammar of the extended language is a bit complicated to specify. However,
specifying appropriate syntactic rules can be done (and has been done, see [45] for
the rst such exposition) and done in roughly the way one would expect. We call the
extended language LPSU . Semantically, LPSU sentences are interpreted in LP -models,
with the novel features being translated as per the two clauses in Figure 4.2. We read
U(;  ) as \until  happens  will be the case" and S(;  ) as \since  happened  
has been the case."
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4.3.6 LPSU as a Solution
Before examining LPSU as a solution to the problem of interpreting NL-sentences like
(1), we state a theorem that will be needed later. It is easy to prove, so its proof is
omitted.
Theorem:
If M; t  S(;  ), and s < t is such that M; s   and M; u   for all
s < u < t, then if s < t0 < t, M; t0  S(;  ) as well.
The rst diculty in implementing a translation of NL-sentences into LPSU is deter-
mining just which NL-occurrences of the word \always" should be translated into LPSU
using S or U rather than H or G. This is a serious but not particularly interesting
diculty, being as it is a case of ordinary NL-ambiguity. Spelling out the details just a
little, there are easily fabricated NL-sentences containing the word \always," for which
it is unclear whether they should be translated using H or using a \since..." clause.1
Putting this aside, a further diculty arises concerning the interpretation of NL-
sentences that should be interpreted using S or U . In these cases, the interpretation
demands the \always" clause be rewritten to take account of the correct hidden condi-
tions on which the S or U operators should depend. In general it will be very dicult
to know what these conditions should be.
This can be seen even in the example already examined. There are natural conditions
we might propose adding to the sentence \there has always been a prime less than three"
when we interpret it as containing a hidden \since..." clause. For example, if we assume
mathematicalia are social constructs, then we could argue this sentence is shorthand for
\since two and three were rst declared to exist, there has been a prime less than three."
This, in turn, is naturally translated into LPSU as S(;Q), with  being the proposition
representing the sentence \two and three have been declared to exist." Things get more
complicated when we examine the NL-sentence
\it has always been the case that it has always been the case
that there is a prime less than three."
(4)
1 This is especially true once we adopt the practice of treating mathematicalia like social constructs.
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If we follow the lead above and translate \there has always been a prime less than
three" as \S(;Q)," then it seems (2) should be translated as \it has always been the
case that S(;Q)." But the occurrence of \always" in this sentence is no more naturally
translated as H than the other. So (2) seems best translated as \S[ ; S(;Q)]" for an
appropriate sentence  . The next few paragraphs show just how dicult nding such
a  is.
Suppose \it has always been the case that there is a prime less than three" means
something like \since  happened, there has been a prime less than three."2 Then it
seems (2) must mean something like \since  happened it has been the case that since
 happened there has been a prime less than 3." Thus, the natural candidate for  is
either  or something logically equivalent to .
But we turned to LPSU to allow us to translate those NL-sentences like (1) that
matter for Cole's account into LPSU as LPSU -sentences that are at least satisable. If
our translation scheme demands  be logically equivalent to , however, then when we
translate (1) into LPSU , the resulting sentence is unsatisable.
To see this, notice S(;Q) ^ :S( ; S(;Q)), is satisable if and only if there is a
model M and time t for which
M; t  S(;Q); and
M; t 6 S[ ; S(;Q)]
From these we conclude
(1) There is a time s so that
(a) s < t,
(b) M; s  , and
(c) M; u  Q for all s < u < t, and
(2) For all v, if
2 It has been suggested to me several times that perhaps we could combine methods here: why not
interpret (2) as S(;HQ)? The problem with this approach is that, when one works out the semantic
details, M; t  S(;HQ) if and only if M; t  :H:^HQ. But then a model of (1) would still require
an LP -model modelling the sentence HQ ^ :HHQ, which we've already seen is impossible.
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(a) v < t and
(b) M; w  S(;Q) for all v < w < t, then
(c) M; v 6  .
But these rule out the possibility that  is logically equivalent to  : The theorem
proved above gives that if s < w < t, then M; w  S(;Q). However, if  is logically
equivalent to  , (1b) guarantees the negation of (2c) when v = s. Thus, not only must
we provide a general strategy for nding the correct conditions  under which an NL-
sentence containing \always" should be interpreted \S(;  )" or \U(;  )" rather than
\H( )" or \G( )," we must also contend with sentences like (1), where the most natural
interpretation would have the outside and inside occurrences \always" subject to the
same condition , but whose satisability depends on us interpreting them otherwise.
But solving these problems would still not allow L2P to deal with a more serious
challenge: the hidden variables account is explicitly contrary to the stated purpose of
Cole's social constructivism. Cole's aim is not to nd an acceptable way to translate
away claims about the atemporality of mathematicalia, but rather to nd ways to gen-
uinely make sense of atemporal mathematicalia in a socially-constructive setting. Cole
introduces temporal proles precisely to allow him to account for the atemporality of
mathematicalia. It was interpreting the complex NL-sentences that arose from the in-
troduction of temporal proles that led us to consider LPSU . So, even if the problems
plaguing the implementation of a translation of natural language into LPSU could be over-
come, the hidden variables account does not oer a genuine option for taking seriously
claims concerning the atemporality of mathematicalia.
4.4 Two-Dimensional Solutions
One might complain at this point that neither solution examined has taken the full
(NL-)syntax of our exemplar sentences to heart. Sentence (1) and, more importantly,
all of Cole's own examples can be read as containing elements of the general form \At
t1,  was true of t2..." Such sentences are indexed both by a temporal perspective (the
time at which  is being asserted) and a temporal location (the time of which 's truth
is asserted). Cole provides a helpful example to make clear that the distinction between
temporal perspective and temporal location is not an entirely articial construction:
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Major League Baseball's regulations permit teams to place a certain number of
players on a 15-day disabled list. League regulations also permit placing a player on the
disabled list retroactively. So, as Cole points out, while
\on the Friday after his injury a player might not be ocially on the 15 day
disabled list, yet on the following Monday he might be retroactively placed
on this list going all the way back to the previous Monday. Hence, who
appears on the ocial disabled lists for a given day can vary over time." [7,
p. 20]
So, if we ask questions about the disabled list with reference only to the particular
temporal location `the Friday after player X's injury', the answers we get will themselves
vary with our temporal perspective.
The remainder of the section will proceed in a somewhat backward manner. First,
I build the appropriate setting for a \doubly-temporal" semantics that can deal with
both temporal locations and temporal perspectives. After this, I produce syntax that
allows us to take advantage of some of these new semantic resources. We then see these
resources allow us to produce a (unique) translation of (1) that (a) takes account of its
full NL-syntax and (b) is satisable.
However, in section 5 we show that while the translation we produce of (1) is sat-
isable in the technical sense of admitting some model, it nonetheless cannot be true
in the real world. In the course of examining this, however, we do nd a way to use
L2P -semantics to produce a hybrid of social constructivism and ctionalism that allows
one to explain how mathematicalia can be social constructs that appear atemporal while
not actually being atemporal.
4.4.1 Semantics
Introducing a second temporal variable to the semantics demands we change everything,
but in mostly unsurprising ways. Models remain triples hT ; <; vi, but the domain of
v, rather than being T , is now T  T . Valuations thus map pairs of times ht1; t2i to
functions from Prop to fT; Fg. In symbols,
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v : T  T  ! ff : Prop  ! fT; Fgg
ht1; t2i 7 ! (Prop 3 P 7 ! vt1;t2(P ) 2 fT; Fg)
If we maintain LP for our language despite the semantic change, then when we turn
to dening truth, validity, etc., it seems we must make a choice about which temporal
variable H (and G, for that matter) will be evaluated with respect to. We could either
say
(a) M; t1; t2  H i M; s; t2   for all s < t1 or
(b) M; t1; t2  H i M; t1; s   for all s < t2.
Now, H was intended to capture (or at least carefully model) the meaning of the
NL-phrase \it has always been the case that...". On examining (a) and (b), though, it
is unclear which best captures this meaning.
To help clarify the matter, we adopt the convention of reading the semantic sequent
\M; t1; t2  " in the following way: the rst temporal variable will specify with respect
to which temporal perspective  is being viewed; the second temporal variable will
specify at which temporal location 's truth is being asserted. Thus, \M; t1; t2  "
should be interpreted as \in model M and from the point of view of t1,  is true as a
statement about t2;" or, briey, \in M from t1,  is true of t2."
Given this reading, changing the temporal variable we interpret H with respect to
gives it very dierent meanings. Interpretation (a) reads \H" as \from the perspective
of any prior time,  is true as a statement about the temporal location under consid-
eration." (b), on the other hand, reads \H" as \from the temporal perspective under
consideration,  is true about any prior time."
Neither of these interpretations is obviously \the right one." Rather, both seem to
capture more precise fragments of the full meaning of the NL-phrase \it has always been
the case that..." than were available in the languages previously examined. So it seems
we ought not choose between (a) and (b), but rather should expand our language to put
both possibilities at our disposal. To this end, in the remainder we let H stand for the
LP interpretation of \always," H for L2P -interpretation (a) and H for L2P interpretation
(b).
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M; t1; t2  G i M; s; t2   for all t1 < s
M; t1; t2  H i M; s; t2   for all s < t1
M; t1; t2  G i M; t1; s   for all t2 < s
M; t1; t2  H i M; t1; s   for all s < t2
Figure 4.3: L2P -Semantics
To conclude the construction, let the language L2P of Priorean Doubly Temporal
Logic be the closure of L under the addition of the four operators H, G, H, and G.
The novel features of L2P -semantics are given in Figure 4.3. The non-novel features are
treated analogously to LP .
4.4.2 An Example
Consider the sentence H ^ :HH. We translate this from L2P into NL in stages as
follows:
(1) H reads \from this perspective,  is true of all prior times."
(2) :HH reads \there is a previous perspective where H fails to be true."
(3) Combining the two, we arrive at a sentence best paraphrased \from this perspective,
 is true of all prior times, but there is a previous time at whose perspective  would
have been false for at least one yet earlier time.
Thus the language L2P allows expressive power sucient to describe very nuanced
interactions between truth and time. In particular, notice if M; t; s  :HH, then
there is a time u < t for which M; u; s  :H. From this we conclude there is a
time v < s for which M; u; v  :. It is worth noting that this is compatible with it
nonetheless being the case that M; t; s  H. This will be carefully demonstrated in a
moment.
4.4.3 The L2P -Solution
In LP , NL-sentences of the form \ has always been the case" were interpreted in the
only available way; namely as H. In L2P , such NL-sentences can be interpreted as
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Quantier Language Truth Conditions
H L M; t  H i M; s   for all s < t
H L2P M; t1; t2  H i M; s; t2   for all s < t1
H L2P M; t1; t2  H i M; t1; s   for all s < t2
Figure 4.4: Guide to Important Temporal Quantiers
either HQ or HQ. (Figure 4.4 summarizes the meanings of these three operators { the
reader may nd it helpful to refer back to this chart in the remainder.) The presence of
these options allows for an acceptable interpretation of (1). In particular, HQ^:HHQ
is the unique plausible interpretation of (1) that is also satisable.
Satisability
Choose an L2P -model M = hR; <; vi, where hR; <i is the real numbers with their usual
ordering, and v satises
v1;s(Q) = T for all s < 1, and
v0;s(Q) = F for all s:
Observe that since v1;s(Q) = T for all s < 1, we have that M; 1; s  Q for all s < 1.
Thus, reading from the appropriate line in Figure 4.3, we see that M; 1; 1  HQ. Also,
from v0;0(Q) = F we conclude M; 0; 0 6 Q. Thus M; 0; 1 6 HQ. But this gives us
that M; 1; 1 6 HHQ. Combining these two results, we see M; 1; 1  HQ ^ :HHQ, so
HQ ^ :HHQ is satisable.
Uniqueness
From a technical perspective, there are eight potential translations of sentence (1) into
L2P :
(i) HQ ^ :HHQ
(ii) HQ ^ :HHQ
(iii) HQ ^ :HHQ
(iv) HQ ^ :HHQ
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(v) HQ ^ :HHQ
(vi) HQ ^ :HHQ
(vii) HQ ^ :HHQ
(viii) HQ ^ :HHQ
It is immediate from the semantic rules that (i) and (viii) are not satisable; the
argument to establish this is precisely parallel to the argument demonstrating H ^
:HH is not satisable in any LP -model. The remaining six sentences are satisable;
models demonstrating this are not dicult to construct. For plausibility, however, we
must not only demonstrate satisability but compatibility with the intended meaning
of (1) in the context of Cole's social constructivism.
Throughout the remainder, assume mathematicalia are social constructs. Let t0 be
any time prior to social construction of the number two, and let R be the real world
considered as an L2P -model. Recall \R; u; v  Q" means \in the real world, from the
perspective of u, Q is true of v." Since t0 is a time prior to the social construction of
the number two, we see that R; t0; s 6 Q for any s whatsoever.
Next, let t1 be Friday, June sixth, 2014 at 10:59pm. Observe that
(a) At t1, Q was true of t1. Since the number two is introduced with an unbounded
temporal prole,
(b) At t1, Q has always been true.
(b) can plausibly be translated into L2P in only two ways: as HQ or as HQ. However, if
we interpret (b) as HQ, then we are left arming R; t1; t1  HQ, and so (reading from
the corresponding row in Figure 4.3), we see R; s; t1  Q for all s < t1. But we just saw
R; t0; s 6 Q for any s. Since t0 < t1, we would thus have both that R; t0; t1 6 Q and
R; t0; t1  Q. Thus the interpretation of the rst conjunct of (1) as HQ is the only L2P
option that allows (1) to be compatible with Cole's social constructivism. This rules
out options (iii)-(v). Notice this argument shows it is in general the case that, on pain
of contradiction, the only sort of atemporality a social constructivist can attribute to
mathematicalia is of the \H" variety. This will be an important detail later.
Finally, the second conjunct of (1) is meant as a denial of the at-all-times verity of
the rst conjunct. Thus, the inside occurrence of \always" in the second conjunct of (1)
should be interpreted in the same way the occurrence of \always" in the rst conjunct
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of (1) is. Only (vi) has the requisite form, so we conclude it is the unique appropriate
translation of (1) into L2P .
4.5 The Real World as an L2P -model
A moment ago, we very casually made reference to \the real world as an L2P -model."
We will now try to make sense of what exactly this phrase means. To do this, we
need to specify what features of the world determine the truth of the semantic sequent
\R; t1; t2  ."
There are two broad approaches one could take to this problem. First, one could
suppose it in fact takes two times to specify which atomic propositions are true in the
real world { that is, that propositional truth is underspecied by considering only a
temporal perspective or only a temporal location. In this case, the fact about the world
that makes \R; t1; t2  " be a truth is simply the fact that  is true at the temporal
location t2 from the perspective of t1. I show below that this method of solving the
problem of the atemporality of socially constructed mathematicalia will not suce { it
neither captures the phenomenology of mathematics nor allows it to play the role in
causal explanation that we want it to.
The second option is to suppose truth takes only one time to specify. In this case,
the correct temporal model of the world is an LP -model. This has as a consequence
that mathematicalia are either not actually atemporal or are not social constructs.
I call the rst option the complicated world option, and the second the simple world
option. In the remainder of this section I expand on these options. While we will see
that neither allows HQ ^ :HHQ to be true in the real world, in the second case we
can interpret L2P -semantics in a way that allows us to recover more of what the social-
constructivist is presumably after than we can in the rst. The last section of the paper
explores this option more.
4.5.1 A Complicated World
Assume truth takes two times to specify. We observed already if R; t; s  :HHQ, then
there is a time u < t and a time v < s for which R; u; v  :Q. Thus, in order to
admit HQ^:HHQ as not just satisable but true, we must admit a pair of times u, v,
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for which it is the case that from the perspective of u, the statement \there is a prime
less than three" is false as a statement about the world at v.3 Thus, pursuing the
complicated world option demands we accept there are temporal perspectives in which
arithmetic \truths" are at best temporarily true.
In a complicated world, then, mathematicians, while free to assert mathematical
truths as holding at all temporal locations, would not be free to simultaneously hold
that these same \truths" would remain true from other temporal perspectives. But
this is exactly the opposite of what the phenomenology of doing mathematics leads
us to believe. It is a feature of our experience as users of mathematics that we are
entirely free not only to assert mathematical truths, but to assert them as true both
from any temporal perspective and about any temporal location. For example, there is
nothing wrong with the mathematical claims of the astrophysicist who, when explaining
her work to a popular audience, says \what I've discovered is that if one were present
in the solar system several billion years ago and found that the density of the cloud
of gas accumulating there was between x and y, then one would be able to infer a
star would form nearby and that 10 billion years later it would be a red giant." But
notice this claim relies on changing both temporal perspectives (to a time several billion
years ago) and temporal locations (to a time several billion years hence), something we
very casually expect the mathematics to withstand. Exactly this type of move is not
generally justied if we admit as true claims of the form :HHQ.
Even putting this aside, the complicated world option still has problems. In par-
ticular, it prevents Cole's account from being a response to a crucial part of Dieterle's
objection. As mentioned above, Dieterle called social constructivism to task for its in-
ability to legitimate the use of mathematics in descriptions of, for example, the very early
universe. This is again at stake: as we saw above, the only type of L2P -atemporality
we can allow mathematicalia is of the H-variety, but many scientic claims are at least
prima facie of a form incompatible with this. For example, returning to our astrophysi-
cal stalking horse, suppose we ask \why is our sun not a blue dwarf?" Again, the likely
answer takes the form \when the Sun was forming, the cloud it accreted from had a
3 The astute reader will at this point wonder why we should care about what the truth is about the
world at time v from any perspective other than v. What seems relevant is what the natural diagonal
LP -model hidden inside the real-world L2P -model gives us. This is an important point which we will
return to shortly.
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density between x and y and a mass of available material between w and z. This caused
the development to proceed in such and such a way." Notice that the fact appealed to
in this explanation is not the density of the cloud from our current temporal perspective,
but the density of the cloud at that time. That is, we do not attribute causal force to
ways things things are, at that time, from our current perspective, but to ways things
are, at that time, from the perspective of that time.4
In more detail: let v be today, w some time early in the development of the solar
system, and let d(t) give the density of matter in the solar neighborhood as a function of
temporal location. Then we would not consider R; v; w  x < d(w) < y a determinative
factor in whether the sun is a blue dwarf today. What determined that the Sun did not
become a blue dwarf was that R; w; w  x < d(w) < y. But exactly this latter fact is
unavailable on the complicated-world interpretation of Cole's account { we cannot infer
features of the ordering of the real numbers (or whether there were real numbers) from
the perspective of a time in the early universe because the only information we have
about the truth of Q at other times involves the truth of Q at other temporal locations
from our current temporal perspective. Formally this can be recognized from the fact
that even if w < v, we cannot infer R; w; w   from R; v; v  H or from R; v; v  H.
4.5.2 A Simple World
If we suppose truth requires only one time to specify, then mathematicalia cannot be
both atemporal and social constructs. This was the lesson of the third section of the
essay and was the reason we moved to L2P . So in this case, Cole simply cannot be both
a social constructivist and admit that mathematicalia actually are atemporal.5 But
this is an unsatisfactory stopping point because (a) the extra structure in L2P -models
feels like it's tracking something, even if that something isn't truth simpliciter, and (b)
it seems social constructivism should at the very least be able to make sense of why it
is that mathematicalia appear to be atemporal. By appeal to an interesting technical
construction, we will be able to resolve both of these issues at once.
4 Thanks to an anonymous referee for helping clarify this passage.
5 The reader whose instinctive response to this is to reach for another temporal dimension may wish
to read the appendix at this time.
85
Given an L2P -model M = hT ; <; vi, x a particular time  and consider the struc-
ture M := hT ; <; v i where v (t) = v;t. M is an LP -model that is, intuitively,
\stacked up" at the time  . For each  2 T , this construction gives an LP -model M ,
that represents the model of the world available at  . It is reasonable to interpret the
phrase \M ; t  " as meaning \at  ,  appeared to be true at t."
Examples
Example 1. Suppose Rt; t  HQ. Then, for all s < t, Rt; s  Q. We conclude that
R; t; s  Q for all s < t. That is, R; t; t  HQ.
Example 2. Suppose R; t; t  HHQ. Then, for all s < t and for all u < s, R; s; u  Q.
But this just means that for all u < s < t, Rs; u  HQ.
In addition to all theM , there is also a natural \diagonal" LP modelM that we
can associate to M. M := hT ; <; vi, where v(t) = vt;t. Notice this denition gives
M; t   if and only if  is true of t at t.
4.5.3
Let's recall the situation: we are assuming that mathematicalia are social constructs.
We are also assuming that the structure of propositional truth is such that it takes only
one time to fully specify it. The world is thus well-modeled by an LP -model we will
call W. We've seen that such a model will not validate both social constructivism and
the claim that mathematicalia are atemporal. So if we are to be social constructivists,
then we must deny that mathematicalia are atemporal.
Recall also that social constructivism (as Cole's brand of it makes explicit) commits
one to the belief that certain normative commitments { for example the normative
commitments we have involving the correct use of number-terms { suce to make it the
case that certain entities do in fact exist. Cole's response to Dieterle made explicit that
a social constructivist must also be committed to these same normative commitments
not only entailing that certain objects do exist, but also that they have existed at other
times. As we've now seen, such claims seem untenable from a semantic perspective.
The technical construction above showed we can read part of the structure of L2P -
models as giving a description of what appears to be true from a given perspective. But
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Model Description
W The Real World as an LP -model
R The Real World as an L2P -model, semantics read normatively
Rt The correct LP -model of the world given the normative commitments in
play at time t
R The \diagonal" model derived from R. We've seen that if R; t  Q, then
W; t  Q.
Figure 4.5: Key to Translation
the reason it sometimes appears as if numbers exist is because at such times one has
the sort of normative commitments that the social constructivist claims suce to make
it the case that numbers exist. Thus, perhaps a more useful perspective to adopt is
to see the fragments of L2P semantics we characterized as giving a description of what
appeared to be true as giving descriptions of what one ought to say is true, given the
normative roles one is allowing various facets of reality to play in one's life.
Adopting this perspective amounts to reading \M; s; t  " as \in M, given the
normative commitments in play at s, one ought to claim  is true of time t." Of course,
it is entirely consistent with this reading of the sequent that at time t,  might fail to
be true. But this need not involve us in a contradiction, because we are only committed
to endorsing  as true about t so long as the norms in play at s remain in play.
Adopting this normative reading of \M; s; t  " has a further and rather unex-
pected result. Recall we showed above the sentence \HQ ^ :HHQ" was the unique
appropriate translation of (1) into L2P . This sentence can also be independently ar-
rived at simply by thinking about what needs to be true in a correct L2P -model of the
world (with the normative reading of its semantics), given we accept that (a) social
constructivism about mathematicalia is true, so that (b) if, at a given time t we ought
to say that, e.g. a prime less than three exists at that time, then a prime less than
three actually does exist at t. In terms of our newly-adopted normative reading of L2P
semantics, (b) allows us to pass from R; t  Q to W; t  Q.
To arrive at \HQ ^ :HHQ", we argue as follows (the reader may nd the Key to
Translation given in Figure 4.5 helpful while reading this argument) Observe that since
we are assuming that social constructivism is true, we must have that, if t is the current
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time, then W; t 6 HQ { social constructivism is incompatible (in LP -models) with
atemporal mathematicalia. Notice if R; t  HQ, then since this entails R; s  Q for
all s < t, which in turn entails that W; t  Q for all s < t, we get W; t  HQ.
But example 2 just showed that R; t  HQ (and, thus, given the previous para-
graph, W; t  HQ) follows from the assumption that R; t; t  HHQ. So to maintain
our social constructivism, we must have that R; t; t  :HHQ.
On the other hand, there is no denying that we recognize rules for the correct use of
number-terms well beyond the range of times for which there existed a society present
to construct the numbers they refer to. That is, we do in fact grant mathematicalia a
normative role in our theorizing about, for example, past times. Among the things this
commits us to is the claim that, given the norms we currently grant mathematicalia, one
ought to endorse the existence of a prime less than three at all past times. That is, that
if t is the current time, then Rt; t  HQ. But Example 1 showed that a consequence of
this is that R; t; t  HQ. Together with the conclusion of the previous paragraph, then,
we get R; t; t  HQ ^ :HHQ
Thus, simply from (a) and (b), the constructions in the previous two paragraphs
lead us to naturally expect that if R is the correct L2P -model of the world, and we
read its semantics normatively, then R; t; t  HQ ^ :HHQ. On the other hand, this
sentence seemed, given the details, the only natural interpretation of (1) { this conuence
of evidence for the correctness of the sequent \R; t; t  HQ ^ :HHQ" is really quite
remarkable and satisfying.
4.6 Fictionalism
So if we assume mathematicalia are social constructs, then we must abandon their
atemporality. We said before that this seems to put much of our very best science at
risk. We should examine this last claim more closely.
The worry cannot merely be that we want scientic theories to not entail falsehoods,
for the simple reason that scientic theories giving rise to falsehoods is the norm. Even
our very best scientic theories give us, even in the ranges where they are maximally
accurate, only approximate truths. From the semantic perspective, though, approximate
truths are just (a fancy type of) falsehoods. So the idea that our scientic theories
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ought not entail falsehoods is not quite accurate { we want to ensure they do not
entail contradictions. Since (classically, at least) anything follows from a contradiction,
a theory that entails contradictions is much worse than simply wrong { it's useless.
What we saw above, however, was that the assumption that mathematicalia are both
socially constructed and atemporal led to genuine contradictions, and the assumption
that mathematicalia are atemporal does seem to be needed in many of our best scientic
theories.
But it is a matter of fact that (as we just pointed out), as a society we recognize
rules for the correct use of number-terms well beyond the range of times for which there
existed a society present to construct them. So what are we to do if we are convinced
(along with Cole) that this recognition commits us to (a) admitting that numbers exist,
and (b) making sense of their existence in a way compatible with the atemporality we
seem to grant them.
The solution is as follows: R provides a model of the sentences we ought to endorse,
given the normative commitments in play at  . Since our best scientic theories need
to assume mathematicalia are atemporal, we infer that R captures the structure of
the world under the hypothesis that atemporal (and, eo ipso non-socially constructed)
mathematicalia exist. If social constructivism is true, this hypothesis is literally false.
Thus, at least some existential claims endorsed by some of the R are literally false.
But if these hypotheses are literally false, one would expect their negations to also be
entailed by an accurate account o the world like R . This, of course, would then mean
that R entailed a contradiction and was thus trivial.
The above technical construction showed that we can get around this by supposing
that we are using distinct fragments of the total L2P -semantics governing the meaning
of our terms when we make the claims \mathematicalia are social constructs" and
\mathematicalia are atemporal." In particular, the R make sense of the latter claim
and R makes sense of the former. L2P thus gives us the resources to arm that
mathematicalia are social constructs while nonetheless allowing us to have non-trivial
scientic theories which behave as if they aren't. Collapse is avoided by our not arming
contradictions: in R , this means we allow mathematicalia that are atemporal but not
social constructs. In R, on the other hand, mathematicalia are socially-constructed
but not atemporal. In neither \dimension" do we get a contradiction, and since the
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semantic theory does not allow inferences across dimensions, collapse is avoided. Thus,
on the semantic theory oered, despite their rather Moore-ian paradoxicality we can
arm as true all of the following:
(i) There is a prime less than three,
(ii) According to our best evidence, a prime less than three has always existed, but
(iii) A prime less than three has not always existed.
In some sense this puts us on the side of the ctionalist { Q is a prototypical mathemat-
ical existence statement; R; t  :Q entails W; t  :Q, and the latter sequent simply
means that Q is literally false at time t. Yet despite this, our scientic theories seem to
endorse claims that have as consequences that R ; t  Q. On the account provided this
can be the case without risk of triviality.
If you're comfortable with such an account and would like to label it a variety of
social constructivism, I won't stand in your way. But there is more than a hint of
ctionalism here as well.
Appendix: What If We Had More Time (Dimensions)?
Given Cole was willing to suppose we could collectively declare objects to have whatever
temporal prole suited our purposes, I see no reason to suppose he would be unwilling to
grant social-constructivism doubly-modal creativity. Thus, Cole could respond to all of
the above by claiming that we can \Declare and collectively recognize that institutional
facets of reality have whatever [doubly-]modal prole best serves our purposes."
My response to this is roughly as follows: modifying all the above arguments, we
could demonstrate that to making of the account that results from allowing socially-
constructed doubly-temporal proles demands moving to triply temporal logic. Cole
could respond to this by proposing we adopt socially-constructed triply-temporal pro-
les, and the back and forth could go on ad innitum.
Being more explicit, Cole could propose that social-constructivism's modal creativ-
ity continues to the second temporal variable. Thus, the community responsible for
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M; f  P i vf (P ) = T
M; f  : i M; f 6  
M; f   ^  i M; f   and M; f   
M; f  Gn i M; g   whenver f(n) < g(n) but g(x) = f(x) for x 6= n
M; f  Hn i M; g   whenver g(n) < f(n) but g(x) = f(x) for x 6= n
Figure 4.6: L1P Semantics
introducing a social construct could declare and collectively recognize that it had what-
ever doubly-temporal prole suited their needs. Nonetheless, we would have to embrace
the following:
It is now the case that for all t1; t2, R; t1; t2  Q, but it has
not always been the case that for all t1; t2, R; t1; t2  Q.
(5)
(3) sounds at least confusing and possibly contradictory, so we need to introduce a
third temporal variable to account for the semantics of (3). The arguments from before
will carry over, mutatis mutandis, to establish that Cole must choose again between
ctionalism and non-atemporal mathematicalia. We could then repeat this process to
force a move to quadruply-temporal logic, etc.
Let's skip to the end of this process and see what the results are. We introduce the
language L1P of innitely temporal logic for this purpose.
4.6.1 Syntax
Alphabetically, L1P diers from a base language L of propositional logic by the addition
of a countable innity of temporal modal operatorsH1, G1, H2, G2, etc. Grammatically,
L1P is the closure of L after the addition of all these operators. Natural language
equivalents of most of these operators are too complex to be worth spelling out.
4.6.2 Semantics
An L1P -model is a triple hT ; <; V i, where
 hT ; <i is a poset (partially ordered set { i.e. < is an irreexive and transitive
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relation on T ) representing the \times" or \moments" together with their ordering
and
 V is a function from T N = ff : N  ! Tg to the set of functions from Prop (the
set of propositions) to the two-element set fT; Fg.
For f 2 T N, V (f) is written Vf . In symbols we have
V : T N  ! fg : Prop  ! fT; Fgg
f 7 ! (Prop 3 P 7 ! Vf (P ) 2 fT; Fg)
To specify the notions of truth, validity, etc., we use the semantic details given in
Figure 4.6. Notice the nal two clauses in this semantic theory are actually clause-
schemes, one instance for each n 2 N.
4.6.3 L1P as a Solution
The observation to make here is exactly the same as the one we made when analyzing
LP or L2P as solutions. Suppose the modal creativity of social constructivism allows
for us to declare and collectively recognize that for absolutely any function f : N  ! T ,
R; f  Q. Then, it seems the sentence
It is now the case that for all f : N  ! T , R; f  Q, but it
has not always been the case that for all such f , R; f  Q. (6)
demands we adopt yet another temporal perspective from which to analyze the semantics
of Cole's account. We would thus be forced to adopt the language L(!+1)P , whose
semantic theory concerned valuations V : ! + 1  ! T . Again, mutatis mutandis, the
above arguments can be given, and again Cole will be forced to abandon one of the core
elements of his theory or ascend to a yet more complex temporal language in which to
state it.
Conclusion
A category need be seen as no more than a way of combining two objects to make a
third that satises some axioms, just as a set need be seen as no more than a way of
collecting or selecting things that satises some axioms. Ways of combining two things
to make a third can, in turn, be perfectly well-understood as two-place functions. An
abstraction principle dening objects that correspond exactly to equivalence classes of
two-place functions that represent the same category can then be given.
The object that has garnered the most attention as a potential sticking point in
discussion of category theory, however, is the category of categories. One might worry
that, even if categories themselves are acceptable, that categories of categories embody
too much complexity to be the type of thing that can be understood on their own.
But just as we can provide an abstractionist theory of categories, we can provide an
abstractionist theory of categories of categories. Further, one can in fact combine the
insights of Chapters 1 and 3: a category of categories is just a way of combining two
things to make a third in which one of the \combinees" behaves as 2 ought, and in which
this combinee is a generator. The phrases \behaves as 2 ought" and \is a generator" in
turn, can be encoded in pure logic, as shown in Chapter 3.
Thus, whether one thought the sticking point was with categories themselves or
with categories of categories, all is well in the land of category theory. Of course, the
last three-quarters of a century of mathematical practice has borne out much the same
conclusion for the set-theoretic perspective. Category theory and set theory provide very
dierent perspectives on mathematics. Both perspectives are perfectly acceptable ways
to look at mathematics, so we are left with a pluralism of mathematical perspectives.
This, in turn, seems to suggest that at least to some extent we can choose what the
referents of our mathematical terms are.
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As I pointed out in the introduction, this should not lead us to conclude the referents
of our mathematical terms { the mathematicalia, if you will { are themselves the kind
of thing that depend on social action. The sort of referential pluralism just discussed
does in fact leave the door open for a certain type of relativism about the nature of
mathematical objects, but it's a relativism of a rather benign sort.
Nonetheless, despite the fact that social constructivism is not a consequence of foun-
dational pluralism, it might tempt one to think favorably of social constructivism, and
even to propose it as an ontological theory regarding mathematical entities. The prob-
lem, we have seen, is that social constructivism involves one in temporal anomalies of
the most pernicious sort. The atemporality of mathematical truths is simply something
that is too costly to our science for us to abandon, but it seems to drive the social
constructivist to rather alarming conclusions { conclusions like \currently, mathematics
has always been true, but it is not the case that mathematics has always had the fea-
ture of having always been true." Making sense of such claims, in turn, demands rather
nuanced semantic analysis and { even after this { cannot be maintained concurrently
with endorsement of the way mathematical practice in fact treats mathematical truth.
Thus, despite the presence of category theory giving rise to a referential pluralism,
we must not be tempted to adopt a social constructivism about mathematicalia.
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